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The Myth of the Independent 
Physician: Implications for 
Health Law, Policy, and Ethics 
Jessica Mantel† 
Abstract 
Physicians increasingly are moving away from solo and small 
group practices to join large organizations, a trend now accelerating 
with the implementation of health care reform. Because physicians 
control as much as ninety percent of all health care spending, 
understanding how health care organizations influence physicians’ 
treatment decisions is of fundamental importance, particularly for 
policymakers, scholars, and ethicists concerned with the quality, cost, 
and rationing of health care. Informed by research in the fields of 
psychology, sociology, and behavioral economics, this Article argues 
that physicians employed by or affiliated with health care 
organizations are part of organizational dynamics that profoundly 
influence their treatment decisions. Unfortunately, much of health 
law, policy, and ethics narrowly focus on the individual physician, 
failing to appreciate the powerful link between organizational culture 
and physicians’ clinical decisions. Scholars, policymakers, and ethicists 
therefore must give greater attention to the organization. Of 
particular concern are health organizations with cultures that bias 
physicians’ clinical decision making in ways that lead to the provision 
of poor-quality or inefficient care or the withholding of necessary care. 
This Article concludes with a discussion of possible ways to promote 
more virtuous organizational cultures that minimize these risks while 
respecting community standards of compassion and fairness.  
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Introduction 
In guaranteeing access to health insurance for millions of 
Americans, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act1 
(“Affordable Care Act”) brings us closer to the goal of universal 
access to medical care. To make universal access sustainable in the 
long term, however, policymakers must go beyond increased access to 
care and address both rising health care costs and deficiencies in the 
quality of care provided to patients. In addition, impending changes 
in the way insurers and government health care programs pay for care 
raises new challenges.2 By placing health care providers on a budget 
 
1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
2. For example, under global payments, or full capitation, providers receive 
a single payment from a payor for each patient they care for. The 
global, or capitated, payments frequently cover all of the cost of treating 
patients over the course of year, although sometimes certain categories 
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for patient care, these payment reforms will lead to health care 
providers rationing medical care.3 This raises important questions 
regarding how best to ensure that they do so in a manner that is both 
reasonable and equitable and that patients are not unfairly denied 
medically appropriate care.4  
With physicians controlling as much as ninety percent of all 
health care spending,5 addressing cost, quality, and health-rationing 
concerns requires an understanding of how physicians make clinical 
decisions. Importantly, the issue of physician decision making must be 
considered against the backdrop of a rapidly transforming health care 
system that has seen a steady decline in the number of physicians 
practicing in solo and small group practices and an increase in 
physicians affiliating with large organizations.6 Informed by research 
 
of care are carved out, such as pharmaceuticals or hospital care. In other 
words, the provider assumes the entire financial risk of treating the 
patient population and thus must work within a budget. See Jeff 
Goldsmith, Physician’s Foundation, The Future of Medical 
Practice: Creating Options for Practicing Physicians to 
Control Their Professional Destiny 38 (2012) (explaining global 
risk). Similarly, bundled payment systems−which employ a single fixed 
payment for an episode of care that is allocated among all providers 
treating a patient−force providers to provide care within a fixed budget. 
See infra note 42 and accompanying text. Finally, shared savings and 
shared risk payment models also incentivize providers to work within a 
budget by rewarding those who meet or exceed targeted cost savings or 
penalizing those who fail to do so. See Jessica Mantel, Accountable Care 
Organizations: Can We Have Our Cake and Eat It Too?, 42 SETON 
HALL L. REV. 1393, 1411 (2012) (explaining the shared savings and 
shared risk models for accountable care organizations).  
3. See Mantel, supra note 2, at 1427 (arguing that payment reforms such 
as shared savings that require providers to lower costs will necessitate 
“gatekeeping,” with providers determining which services should be 
provided to individual patients). 
4. See id. at 1427–28, 1436 (describing the need for regulatory oversight of 
providers who assume financial risk in order to ensure providers 
appropriately balance cost and quality considerations and do not 
inappropriately withhold care). 
5. See John Eisenberg, Physician Utilization: The State of Research About 
Physicians’ Practice Patterns, 40 MED. CARE 1016, 1016 (2002) (noting that 
physician decisions govern as much as ninety percent of how health care 
dollars are spent); Alan Sager & Deborah Socolar, Bos. Univ. Sch. 
of Pub. Health, Health Costs Absorb One-Quarter of Economic 
Growth, 2000–2005, at 29 (2005) (stating that physicians’ decisions 
“control fully 87 percent of the personal health care dollar”). 
6. See, e.g., Stephen L. Isaacs et al., The Independent Physician—Going, 
Going . . ., 360 New Eng. J. Med. 655, 655–57 (2009) (stating that 
“[t]he percentage of U.S. physicians who own their own practice has 
been declining at an annual rate of approximately 2% for at least the 
past 25 years” and that the percentage of physicians in small practices—
practices with ten or fewer physicians—“decreased by nearly 15% 
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in the fields of psychology, sociology, and behavioral economics, this 
Article is the first to provide a comprehensive theory of how the 
organizational cultures of these health care organizations (HCOs) 
powerfully influence physicians’ clinical judgments. The Article also 
discusses the implications of this new theory for health law, policy, 
and ethics. 
Many health law scholars, policymakers, and ethicists 
conceptualize patient care as being provided at the level of the 
individual physician, as opposed to by the HCO. The focus on the 
individual physician reflects the fact physicians retain a high degree of 
autonomy over their patients’ care given the inherent nature and 
complexity of medicine.7 Yet despite their professional autonomy, 
physicians employed by or affiliated with HCOs are part of 
organizational dynamics that powerfully influence their treatment 
decisions. In particular, an HCO’s organizational culture—its shared 
norms, values, attitudes, and patterns of behavior—influence both 
how a physician perceives a patient’s situation and the thought 
patterns, assumptions, and values that guide the physician’s clinical 
decision making. Focusing on the deeds of individual physicians and 
ignoring the influence of the organization thus leads to a factually 
inaccurate account of patient care upon which to base health care 
policy.  
In recognition of the organization’s role in shaping physicians’ 
treatment decisions, some areas of health law, policy, and ethics have 
broadened their focus to include the HCO, particularly in the area of 
payment policy.8 Unfortunately, other areas of health law, policy, and 
 
between 1996 and 2004”). Indeed, most physicians believe that “the 
traditional model of independent private practice is either ‘on shaky 
ground’ or ‘is a dinosaur soon to go extinct.’” Merritt Hawkins, 
Health Reform and the Decline of Private Physician 
Practice: A White Paper Examining the Effects of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act on Physician 
Practices in the United States 46 (2010). The types of 
organizations physicians are joining vary but include integrated delivery 
systems, multispecialty group practices, and accountable care 
organizations. Many physicians are also becoming employees of 
hospitals. See Suzanne M. Kirchoff, Cong. Research Serv., 
R42880, Physician Practices: Background, Organization, and 
Market Consolidation (2013) (describing the types of organizations 
with which physicians affiliate and the increase in hospital employment 
among physicians).  
7. See Theodore W. Ruger, Can a Patient-Centered Ethos Be Other-
Regarding? Ought It Be?, 45 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1513, 1516 (2010) 
(stating that although medical care is provided in a complex delivery 
system, medical decisions remain devolved to the level of the individual 
doctor and patient). 
8. See infra notes 40–44 and accompanying text (discussing recent shifts in 
how Medicare and other payors pay for health care). 
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ethics narrowly emphasize physicians’ individual competence levels, 
their personal values, and potential conflicts of interest. For example, 
although courts have adopted concepts of institutional liability for 
poor-quality care, malpractice cases based on alleged physician error 
generally treat physicians as isolated actors who are individually 
responsible for their patient-care decisions.9 Similarly, with respect to 
whether certain financial arrangements may adversely impact the 
quality of patient care, many commentators focus on financial 
incentives operating at the level of the individual physician, 
minimizing the risk of financial incentives tied to a group’s or 
organization’s performance.10 Various laws governing financial 
 
9. See infra Part IV.C.1 (noting that even with various forms of 
institutional liability, the focus in many malpractice cases remains on 
the conduct of the individual physician). 
10. For example, in commenting on health maintenance organization 
(HMO) physician-incentive plans, the General Accounting Office (GAO; 
now called the Government Accountability Office) concluded that 
“incentive plans that base the amount of payment on the cost 
performance of individual physicians have a relatively higher potential 
to adversely affect quality of care than do plans based on group cost 
performance.” U.S. Gen. Acct. Office, GAO/HRD-89-29, 
Medicare: Physician Incentive Payments by Prepaid Health 
Plans Could Lower Quality of Care 25 (1988). Others similarly 
have questioned whether incentives for individual physicians “apply 
undue pressure to conserve resources and may lead to inadequate 
medical care for patients,” with the American Medical Association 
(AMA) Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs recommending incentives 
based on group performance rather than individual incentives. Stephen 
A. Magnus, Physicians’ Financial Incentives in Five Dimensions: A 
Conceptual Framework for HMO Managers, 24 Health Care Mgmt. 
Rev. 57, 65 (1999). Relying on classic economic theory, commentators 
have argued that financial incentives tied to the group’s performance, 
rather than the individual physician’s performance, have little effect on 
a physician because of the weak link between the individual physician’s 
clinical decisions and any financial benefit the physician derives from 
the group-based payment. As explained by the GAO, “[t]he more 
physicians and the more patients whose treatment costs determine the 
size of the available incentive funds, the more remote individual 
treatment decisions become from the amount of payment received and 
the less likely reduction of quality will occur.” U.S. Gen. Acct. 
Office, supra note 10, at 25; see also Stephen R. Latham, Regulation 
of Managed Care Incentive Payments to Physicians, 22 AM. J.L. & MED. 
399, 410 (1996) (“The fact that risk is spread over more encounters 
[with group-based financial incentives] also means that incentives 
applied to the behavior of intermediary groups, such as hospital-
physician joint ventures or physician practice groups, should be less 
intense than incentive plans that apply directly to the clinical choices of 
individual physicians.”).  
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arrangements in the health care sector reflect this focus on the 
individual physician’s financial incentives.11 
An approach to physician behavior that narrowly focuses on the 
individual physician, however, overlooks the fact that physicians often 
are members of dynamic organizations that profoundly influence 
physicians’ professional judgments. While I do not mean to advance 
an argument for abandoning or weakening regulation of individual 
physicians and their financial incentives, a model of physician 
behavior that incorporates the impact of organizational culture reveals 
the inadequacies of focusing too much on individual physicians and 
too little on HCOs.12 Of particular concern are HCOs with 
organizational cultures that bias physicians’ treatment decisions in 
ways that result in poor-quality or inefficient care or the withholding 
of necessary care. Scholars and policymakers concerned about the cost 
and quality of patient care and the fairness of health-rationing 
decisions must give greater attention to how best to promote HCOs 
with virtuous organizational cultures.  
Part I discusses the trend of physicians moving away from solo 
and small group practices and affiliating with large HCOs. 
Understanding how this shift impacts physicians’ professional 
judgments requires a general understanding of how physicians make 
clinical decisions. Part II addresses this issue, explaining that, when 
faced with medical uncertainty or difficult value trade-offs, physicians’ 
professional judgments are guided by cognitive frameworks, or 
schemas, that organize their knowledge, assumptions, and values.  
Drawing on the work of sociologists, psychologists, and 
economists, Part III then argues that HCOs’ organizational cultures 
profoundly influence physicians’ clinical decisions by shaping 
 
11. For example, although referrals between physicians in the same group 
practice enhance the group’s income, the Stark law, 42 U.S.C. § 1395nn 
(2012), exempts from the general prohibition on physician self-referrals 
referrals between physicians in the same group practice unless the 
referring physician is compensated in a manner that takes into account 
the volume and value of such referrals. See id. § 1395nn(a) (2006 & 
Supp. V 2011) (general prohibition against physician self-referrals); 
id. § 1395nn(b)(2) (in-office ancillary services exception); 
id. § 1395nn(h)(4)(A) (defining “group practice”). The Stark law 
similarly exempts from the general prohibition on physician self-referrals 
distributions of an organization’s profits and productivity bonuses paid 
to a physician as long as they do not relate to the volume or value of 
the physician’s referrals. Id. § 1395nn(h)(4)(B)(i). 
12. See Ann Barry Flood & Mary L. Fennell, Through the Lenses of 
Organizational Sociology: The Role of Organizational Theory and 
Research in Conceptualizing and Examining Our Health Care System, 
35 J. Health & Soc. Behav. 154, 163 (1995) (stating that models of 
health care need to be expanded to fit the complexities of the health 
care system, including the noneconomic factors involved, “so that we 
can understand the inadequacies of financial-based policies”). 
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physicians’ cognitive schemas. Specifically, Part III.A demonstrates 
the effect a physician’s organizational peers have on the physician’s 
professional judgment, particularly in conditions of clinical 
uncertainty. Part III.B then describes how a physician’s identification 
with an HCO engenders both loyalty to the organization and 
internalization of the organization’s norms and values. Part III.C 
concludes with a discussion of how a physician’s self-interest—as 
shaped by the HCO—subconsciously biases clinical judgments by 
causing the physician to apply self-serving cognitive schemas. The 
cumulative effect of this dynamic is to produce among an HCO’s 
physicians a shared practice style that reflects commonality in values 
and philosophies.  
Finally, Part IV examines the implications of the link between 
physicians’ patient-care decisions and HCOs’ organizational culture 
for health law, policy, and ethics. First, Part IV.A argues that the 
field of health ethics should give greater attention to HCOs’ 
organizational ethics and reexamine existing professional ethical 
principles that reflect a paradigm of the independent physician. 
Part IV.B then considers whether regulators should mandate that 
HCOs adopt certain internal structures or arrangements believed to 
promote more virtuous organizational cultures. Part IV.C concludes 
with a discussion of various legal and policy reforms that would 
impose greater accountability on HCOs for the cost and quality of 
patient care. 
I. The Rise of the Health Care Organization 
For much of the twentieth century, the health care system was 
dominated by independent physicians practicing as solo practitioners 
or in small groups.13 Free from corporate or bureaucratic controls, 
physicians enjoyed high levels of professional autonomy and 
maintained primary authority over the provision of medical care.14 
This system of “professional dominance” was reinforced by a payment 
system that reimbursed health providers on a fee-for-service basis, 
paying providers a separate payment for each unit of service they 
provided without regard to its quality or cost-effectiveness.15 The past 
 
13. See Thomas G. Rundall et al., A Theory of Physician-Hospital 
Integration: Contending Institutional and Market Logics in the Health 
Care Field, 45 J. Health & Soc. Behav. 102, 104 (2004) (noting that 
for most of the past century, physicians organized themselves into solo 
practices or small groups). 
14. See id. at 103 (stating that the traditional form of organizing physician 
services “maintain[ed] physicians’ autonomy from organizational controls 
and authority over medical care decisions”). 
15. See Mantel, supra note 2, at 1403–04 (explaining fee-for-service 
reimbursement). 
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few decades, however, have seen a steady decline in solo and small 
group physician practices and the emergence of new delivery models 
centered on large organizations.16 Implementation of health care 
reform has only accelerated this trend.17  
Frustrated with the rising cost of health care, in the 1980s 
employers, insurers, and policymakers began demanding that the 
health care sector achieve greater efficiencies in the provision of care.18 
So began the era of managed care, as private sector payors and 
government health programs changed how they contract with and 
reimburse physicians and other health care providers.19 Employers and 
private insurers fostered greater competition among physicians and 
hospitals by contracting with a limited number of providers, leading 
many physicians and hospitals to agree to discounted reimbursement 
rates.20 In addition, both private and public payors moved away from 
 
16. See Merritt Hawkins, supra note 6, at 4 (stating that the 
independent, private physician practice model will be largely replaced by 
models of care built around larger organizations, including accountable 
care organizations, large independent physician groups, and large 
aligned groups); see also Isaacs et al., supra note 6, at 655–56 (noting 
that the percentage of physicians who own their own practices has been 
declining at a rate of approximately two percent for the past twenty-five 
years and that the percentage of physicians in small practices—practices 
with ten or fewer physicians—decreased by nearly fifteen percent 
between 1996 and 2004). 
17. See Mary Witt et al., Cal. HealthCare Found., Physician-
Hospital Integration in the Era of Health Reform 15 (2010) 
(“Health care reform . . . has accelerated the trend toward 
integration . . . .”); Clayton Harbeck, Hospital-Physician Alignment: 
The 1990s Versus Now, Healthcare Fin. Mgmt., Apr. 2011, at 48, 
50 (stating that health care reform has accelerated the trend of 
collaborations between health systems and physicians, including 
organizations employing physicians). 
18. See Thomas Bodenheimer & Kip Sullivan, How Large Employers Are 
Shaping the Health Care Marketplace, 338 Health Pol’y Rep. 1003, 
1003 (1998) (stating that in the late 1980s employers “began to rebel” 
against rising health care premiums); Mark Hall, Institutional Control of 
Physician Behavior: Legal Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 
137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 435–38 (1988) (discussing government initiatives 
to address rising health care costs); Glen P. Mays et al., Managed Care 
Rebound? Recent Changes in Health Plans’ Cost Containment 
Strategies, Health Aff. (Web Exclusive) W4-427, W4-427 (Aug. 
11, 2004), http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/early/2004/08/11/ 
hlthaff.w4.427.short (noting that during the early 1990s, rising health 
care spending led employers to prompt health plans to contain costs). 
19. See Rundall et al., supra note 13, at 103 (discussing changes since the 
early 1980s in the way public and private health plans contract with 
and compensate health care providers). 
20. See id. at 105 (stating that “public and private health plans began to 
selectively contract with hospitals and physicians in order to use 
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traditional fee-for-service payment to new methods of reimbursement 
that gave providers financial incentives to reduce costs, such as 
capitation and prospective payment.  
Physicians, hospitals, and other providers responded to these 
changes by entering into various types of collaborative arrangements. 
Under these new delivery models, physicians no longer operated 
separately from one another but to varying degrees jointly managed 
patient care, often in collaboration with hospitals.21 For example, 
physicians formed larger physician groups; joined independent 
practice associations (IPAs)22 and physician-hospital organizations 
(PHOs);23 and became employees of hospitals, hospital-owned medical 
groups, and integrated delivery systems.24  
While the types of HCOs physicians affiliated with varied greatly, 
they all shared a common purpose—positioning physicians and other 
health care providers to succeed in a world of managed care.25 The  
competitive forces to drive down health care prices” and that new 
methods of payment forced providers to find new ways to reduce costs); 
For a definition of capitation, see supra note 2. Prospective payment 
refers to paying hospitals a fixed payment for a hospital admission based 
on a patient’s diagnosis, regardless of how many services were provided 
to the patient. See Merritt Hawkins, supra note 6, at 9 (explaining 
Medicare’s prospective payment system). 
21. See Rundall et al., supra note 13, at 105 (explaining that integration 
generally “refers to activities and mechanisms used to achieve unity of 
effort across different specialized areas”).  
22. An IPA is a network of physicians that collectively contract with HMOs 
and managed care plans. IPA physicians maintain a high degree of 
independence in that they continue to own and manage their own 
practices, with the IPA’s primary function being to negotiate and 
administer managed care contracts for its physicians. See Witt et al., 
supra note 17, at 15 (defining IPA). 
23. A PHO is a joint venture between a hospital or hospital system and 
physicians to jointly contract with managed care organizations, with the 
PHO distributing to physicians and hospitals funds received under these 
contracts and providing administrative, management, and marketing 
support. More recently, PHOs have tied their reimbursement of 
physicians to the physicians’ performance on various quality indicators. 
See Bhagwan Satiani & Patrick Vaccaro, A Critical Appraisal of 
Physician-Hospital Integration Models, 51 J. Vascular Surgery 1046, 
1049 (2010) (defining PHO). 
24. See Gloria J. Bazzoli et al., Two Decades of Organizational Change in 
Health Care: What Have We Learned?, 61 Med. Care Res. & Rev. 
247, 248 (2004) (describing the different types of arrangements 
physicians entered into in response to managed care). 
25. See Keith D. Moore & Dean C. Coddington, Multiple Paths to 
Integrated Health Care, Healthcare Fin. Mgmt., Dec. 2009, at 47, 54 
(stating that integration efforts in the late 1980s and 1990s, particularly 
those involving hospitals, “[were] pursued with a single point of focus—
positioning for manage care contracting”). 
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health care industry believed these collaborations offered two major 
benefits. First, it was believed that these ventures gave providers a 
vehicle for realizing the efficiencies and improved patient outcomes 
demanded by payors.26 For example, these larger organizations 
allowed for administrative and operational efficiencies due to 
economies of scale.27 They also had the resources, capital, and 
infrastructure to support acquiring health information systems, 
improving the coordination of patient care across providers, and 
developing clinical guidelines and protocols.28 Second, these new 
organizations’ larger size and market share gave their members 
greater bargaining power in their negotiations with managed care 
plans. Physicians and other providers who formed HCOs thereby 
obtained more favorable contract terms and payment rates than they 
could have negotiated on their own.29 
Despite the promise of these new delivery models, their results 
were decidedly mixed.30 Lacking experience in medical management, 
many HCOs failed to achieve the degree of clinical integration—the 
coordination of patient care across the organization—that experts 
believe is necessary for greater efficiencies and improved patient 
 
26. See Bazzoli et al., supra note 24, at 248 (discussing how during the 
1980s and 1990s hospitals and physicians reorganized themselves “with 
the stated purposes of improving efficiency, financial performance, long-
term survival, community accountability, and patient outcomes,” with 
their arrangements providing a platform for integration and 
collaboration). 
27. See Witt et al., supra note 17, at 8 (stating that in the 1990s 
physicians formed large group practices and IPAs in order to achieve 
economies of scale). 
28. See generally Rundall et al., supra note 13, at 105 (stating that 
partnerships such as those between hospitals and physicians gave 
physicians access to the managerial infrastructure that would support 
better management of patients); Howard S. Zuckerman et al., 
Physicians and Organizations: Strange Bedfellows or a Marriage Made 
in Heaven?, 14 Frontiers Health Servs. Mgmt. 3, 12–13 (1998) 
(describing how large organizations such as integrated delivery systems 
could achieve economies of scale and enhance quality of care by 
providing a coordinated system of care and “crucial resources such as 
capital and information systems”). 
29. See Merritt Hawkins, supra note 6, at 8 (describing these earlier moves 
toward integration as “aimed largely at gaining bargaining power”); 
Steven W. Floyd et al., Institutional Forces in the Acceptance of Managed 
Care Practices by Physicians, 30 Health Care Mgmt. Rev. 237, 242 
(2005) (stating that the trend toward forming larger groups was for the 
purpose of achieving the economic benefits of increased market power and 
“the ability to obtain more favorable contract terms”). 
30. See Bazzoli et al., supra note 24, at 248 (“If one were to select at 
random a set of health organizations and assess their success at 
restructuring, one would observe mixed results.”). 
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outcomes.31 Few large physician groups, for example, adopted 
adequate utilization controls designed to lower costs and coordinate 
care, such as clinical protocols or guidelines.32 Moreover, with health 
information technology still in its infancy, HCOs often lacked the 
data necessary to track service costs or develop clinical protocols and 
guidelines.33 Many HCOs also failed to successfully integrate 
 
31. See generally Stephen M. Shortell et al., Remaking Health Care 
in America: The Evolution of Organized Delivery Systems, 129 
(2d ed. 2000) (describing the results of a 1996 study finding low levels of 
clinical integration, and explaining that clinical integration is “the most 
important element” in achieving cost-effective care); Goldsmith, supra 
note 2, at 35 (discussing the failures of physician organizations to 
effectively manage patient care). Clinical integration refers to greater 
coordination of patient care across people, functions, activities, and sites 
over time in order to enhance the quality and efficiency of patient care. 
See Shortell et al., supra, at 129 (defining clinical integration). 
Common activities of clinical integration include “utilization 
management programs, scheduling and registration systems, information 
systems that can track utilization by patient and provider, development 
of care standards, continuous quality improvement programs, clinical 
service lines, case management systems, population-based community 
health models, disease and demand management systems, common 
patient identifiers, and disease registries.” Lawton Robert Burns & 
Ralph W. Muller, Hospital-Physician Collaboration: Landscape of 
Economic Integration and Impact of Clinical Integration, 86 Milbank 
Q. 375, 380–82 (2008).  
 Rather than promote clinical integration, most HCOs focused their 
efforts on building the organization and promoting economic integration 
through the alignment of physicians’ financial interests with the 
organization’s goals. See Shortell et al., supra, at 129 (discussing 
that health systems in the 1990s focused their attention and energy on 
“putting the pieces of the system together, building a functional 
infrastructure, and negotiating relationships with physicians”); 
Stephen M. Shortell & Rodney K. McCurdy, Integrated Health Systems, 
in Engineering the System of Healthcare Delivery 369, 371 
(W.B. Rouse and D.A. Cortese eds. 2010) (“The failure of most 
[integrated delivery systems] to provide greater value over the past 15 
years has been due to their over-emphasis on achieving functional and 
economic integration to the neglect of the clinical integration process.”); 
Satiani & Vaccaro, supra note 23, at 1050 (stating that these new 
organizations “failed to fulfill their potential because the main driver 
was to create a structure rather than to develop objectives or the 
desired outcome of integration”). 
32. See Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 35 (stating that “in many risk-bearing 
physician groups, utilization controls were inadequate or completely 
nonexistent,” few or no clinical protocols or guidelines existed, and the 
organizations merely managed payment). 
33. See id. (explaining that prior to the development of electronic health 
records, organizations “had no way of tracking services costs for 
patients” in a timely manner and that “[fe]w or no clinical protocols or 
guidelines existed in most physician organizations to guide optimal 
physician decision making”); Witt et al., supra note 17, at 13 (one 
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physicians into their organization, with physicians often viewing 
themselves as separate from the HCO and as having divergent 
interests, values, and goals.34 
While some HCOs realized their potential, for most the goals of 
greater efficiencies and quality improvements proved elusive.35 As a 
result, many HCOs experienced economic distress,36 with hospitals in 
particular suffering significant financial losses.37 The late 1990s thus 
brought a decline in these multi-provider partnerships, with many 
HCOs disbanding and numerous hospitals dissolving their 
arrangements with employed physicians.38 
Even though these early partnerships saw many failures, a 
convergence of factors has brought renewed interest in integration.39 
 
reason for the financial losses suffered by hospitals that entered into 
arrangements with physicians was the lack of access to timely data). 
34. See Sara A. Kreindler et al., Interpretations of Integration in Early 
Accountable Care Organizations, 90 Milbank Q. 457, 458 (2012) 
(stating that the push toward vertically integrated systems in the 1990s 
“did not create the desired social-psychological change: Despite being 
nominally part of the same organization, physicians and hospitals 
continued to see themselves as separate groups with divergent interests, 
values, and worldviews”); see also Burns & Muller, supra note 31, at 
393 (discussing research from the 1990s which found that “membership 
in PHOs and IPAs had little effect on physicians’ identification or 
commitment” to integrated delivery networks). 
35. See Kreindler et al., supra note 34, at 459 (“While some integrated 
systems have achieved exceptional performance, many others have 
faltered . . . .”).  
36. See, e.g., Lawton R. Burns et al., History of Physician-Hospital 
Collaboration: Obstacles and Opportunities, in Partners in Health: 
How Physicians and Hospitals Can Be Accountable Together 
18, 30 (Francis J. Crosson & Laura A. Tollen eds., 2010) (noting that 
many integrated delivery systems suffered economic stress, including one 
major bankruptcy); Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 35 (“[N]umerous 
physician groups incurred huge economic losses and went bankrupt.”). 
37. See Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 16 (“[The] hospital excursion into 
physician employment was an economic disaster.”). 
38. See id. (“Many hospitals aggressively divested physician practices in the 
late 1990s and into the early 2000s.”); Merritt Hawkins, supra note 6, 
at 8 (“When demand for managed care ebbed in the late 1990s, many of 
these partnerships disbanded . . . .”); Burns & Muller, supra note 31, at 
383 (“The number of these models peaked in 1996 and since then has 
steadily declined . . . .”); Satiani & Vaccaro, supra note 23, at 1049 
(“[H]ospitals began to divest themselves of their employed primary care 
practices in an attempt to minimize further financial losses.”). 
39. See Witt et al., supra note 17, at 2 (noting that “[b]y early 2010, 
integration was again on the upswing in response to” new payment 
methodologies that require physicians and hospitals to better coordinate 
care and align their financial incentives); Moore & Coddington, supra 
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Most importantly, payors impatient with rising health care costs and 
variable quality of care are again exploring alternatives to fee-for-
service, such as tying payments to patient outcomes and overall 
costs.40 In addition, the rising financial costs and administrative 
burdens of operating an independent, private practice are pushing 
many physicians out of private practice and into HCOs. 
Although the renewed drive toward integration started with 
changes in how private payors reimburse health care providers, health 
care reform has accelerated this trend by fundamentally altering 
Medicare’s payment policies. In particular, Medicare’s new Shared 
Savings Program calls for providers to form integrated entities known 
as accountable care organizations (ACOs), with an ACO’s provider-
members held jointly accountable for the cost and quality of care 
provided to the ACO’s patients.41 Medicare’s new bundled payments 
program similarly incentivizes providers to work together. Providers 
participating in the bundled payment program receive a single 
payment for an episode of care that then is allocated among all 
providers treating a patient. This in turn encourages a patient’s 
providers to work together to avoid high costs that could exhaust the 
fixed payment.42 The Affordable Care Act also shifts the Medicare 
program away from its past practice of paying physicians and 
hospitals solely based on the volume of services provided to patients, 
without regard to the quality of care. For example, Medicare’s 
 
note 25, at 47 (“A convergence of factors is creating a renewed interest 
in integrated health care.”). 
40. See Jeroen Trybou et al., The Ties That Bind: An Integrative 
Framework of Physician-Hospital Alignment, 11 BMC Health Servs. 
Res. 3 (2011) (commenting that payors are implementing “a broad 
array of public and private-sector initiatives” that hold providers 
financially accountable for the cost of care and promote improved 
quality of care). 
41. See Mantel, supra note 2, at 1410–12 (describing the ACO model and 
Medicare’s Shared Savings Program). The Shared Savings Program has 
generated tremendous activity in the health care sector, with many 
physicians and hospitals forming, or contemplating forming, ACOs. See 
Gary D. Ahlquist et al., Booz & Co., Accountable Care 
Organizations: The New Player in the Health-Reform 
Landscape 2 (2011) (noting the “swelling wave of ACO activity in the 
U.S. healthcare market,” and reporting that “virtually every” major 
private health insurer is either “involved in, planning, or seriously 
considering ACOs,” and that seventy-four percent of hospital chief 
executives state that “their organizations will be part of an ACO within 
the next five years”). 
42. See Burns et al., supra note 36 (“Bundled payments likely require 
providers to coordinate care . . . .”); Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 38 
(explaining that bundled payments are a form of insurance risk, as 
poorly coordinated care can result in higher costs that exhaust the fixed 
bundled payment, exposing the contracting group to losses). 
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hospital value-based purchasing program ties hospitals’ 
reimbursement rates to patient outcomes, a change that will require 
hospitals to work more closely with their physicians in order to 
improve the quality of hospital care.43 Future Medicare adjustments 
to physician payments based on patient outcomes similarly will 
encourage physicians to look for assistance in raising the quality of 
care they provide to patients.44  
Many in the health care industry believe that success under these 
various payment reforms requires physicians to collaborate with one 
another and with hospitals.45 As previously noted, HCOs are more 
likely than independent physicians to achieve the efficiencies and 
improved patient outcomes demanded by payors. Moreover, in 
contrast to earlier HCOs, today’s HCOs are placing greater emphasis 
on clinical integration as the key to achieving these objectives,46 a 
trend supported by recent improvements in health information 
technology.47 The HCOs of today thus offer greater opportunities for 
 
43. See Burns et al., supra note 36, at 38 (commenting that pay-for-
performance models, or value-based purchasing, which “reward hospitals 
for improvements, may [also] require physicians to collaborate”); Witt 
et al., supra note 17, at 5 (stating that various payment methodologies 
under health care reform “require increased collaboration and financial 
integration between physicians and hospitals”). Another Medicare 
payment program that ties payments to quality of care is the new 
Medicare Hospital Readmissions Reductions Program, which reduces 
payments to hospitals for certain avoidable readmissions. See Witt et 
al., supra note 17, at 20 (discussing Medicare’s new hospital 
readmission payment rules).  
44. See Jordan Rau, Medicare Speeds Up Pay Plan, WASH. POST, July 22, 
2013, at A15 (quoting Kavita Patel and explaining that smaller 
physician groups will have difficulty adjusting to Medicare’s value-based 
program, while larger physician groups have figured out how to do so); 
see generally Burns & Muller, supra note 31, at 383 (describing how 
pay-for-performance models that compensate physicians for care 
improvements require physicians to collaborate with hospitals); Moore & 
Coddington, supra note 25, at 53 (stating that being part of large, 
integrated systems gives physicians the opportunity to practice higher 
quality care than those in solo or small group practice). 
45. See Burns et al., supra note 36, at 37 (stating that new payment 
methodologies “will require hospitals and physicians to work together”). 
46. See John H. Duffy, A Push For Clinical Integration, Trustee, July–
Aug. 2011, at 30, 30 (commenting that while in the past clinical 
integration was rarely achieved, major organizations have recently made 
investments to increase clinical integration); Keith D. Terry, Clinical 
Integration Sets the Stage for Positive Change, Health Mgmt. Tech., 
Sept. 2012, at 16, 16 (“[M]any healthcare organizations are racing to 
embrace clinical integration strategies.”).  
47. Advancements in health information technology support greater clinical 
integration by allowing today’s HCOs to collect quality data, develop 
clinical guidelines and protocols, implement quality improvement 
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improved care at lower costs relative to earlier HCOs.48 In addition, 
the assumption of financial risk for the aggregate cost of caring for a 
group of patients “is a game of large numbers”—as providers must 
spread this risk across a large patient population in order to protect 
themselves from the possibility of a few patients requiring costly 
care.49 Aligning with large organizations, therefore, is essential for any 
physician assuming financial risk under these new payment models.50 
Not surprising, then, physicians are showing a renewed interest in 
participating in integrated delivery models.51 
In addition to payment reforms, the changing economics of 
private practice also is prompting physicians to join HCOs.52 Solo and 
small group physicians face stagnant or declining reimbursement 
rates,53 in part because they lack bargaining leverage with private 
payors given their small size.54 Independent practices also face rising 
overhead costs and administrative burdens.55 For example, by 2015, 
 
initiatives, and enhance care coordination. See Mantel, supra note 2, at 
1416; see also Merritt Hawkins, supra note 6, at 20 (explaining the 
benefits of electronic health records and how relative to the 1980s and 
1990s providers can now use technology to measure quality). 
48. See Moore & Coddington, supra note 25, at 53 (noting that physicians 
have concluded that affiliating with HCOs affords them “the 
opportunity to practice higher quality, more cost-effective medicine than 
[does a] solo practice or small [group]”). 
49. Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 38 (arguing that providers who assume 
financial risk must ensure that the risk is spread over a large patient 
population).  
50. See id. (explaining that aggregating large numbers of physicians “is an 
essential precondition of organizing for risk”). 
51. See supra note 6 (reporting on the shift away from solo and small group 
practices to HCOs).  
52. See Moore & Coddington, supra note 25, at 49 (identifying the 
changing economics of private practice as a factor driving the 
movement toward integration). 
53. See Merritt Hawkins, supra note 6, at 14 (stating that 
reimbursement cuts, alongside other challenges, “have pushed 
[physician] practices to the breaking point”); Burns & Muller, supra 
note 31, at 391 (reporting that physicians’ reimbursement is declining); 
Michael Zeis, Physician Alignment: Integration Over Independence, 
HealthLeaders Media: Intelligence, Sept. 2012, at 1, 9 (stating 
that independent physicians “worry about [their] declining 
reimbursements”). 
54. See Isaacs et al., supra note 6, at 656 (explaining that independent 
physicians’ incomes have declined because they are disadvantaged in 
contract negotiations). 
55. See Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 9 (stating that physician practice 
overhead costs have steadily risen in the past fifty years, rising at a rate 
four times the rate of inflation). 
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physicians must either incorporate into their practices meaningful use 
of electronic health records or accept the penalty of lower 
reimbursement rates under Medicare.56 Physicians also face increased 
documentation and data-reporting requirements stemming from the 
previously discussed payment reforms and Medicare’s various quality 
reporting obligations.57 Meeting these requirements requires a 
substantial investment in technology and staff, as well as the 
physician’s time. Many solo and small group practices, however, lack 
the capital or willingness to undertake these burdens.58  
HCOs offer physicians an attractive alternative to the demands 
and burdens of private practice. With their superior resources, HCOs 
can provide the capital, technology, and staff needed to support 
today’s practice of medicine, freeing physicians to focus their energies 
on treating patients and allowing them to find a better work-life 
balance.59 Consequently, physicians increasingly are willing to give up 
the autonomy of independent practice in order to reap the benefits of 
affiliating with an HCO.  
While certainly not all physicians have moved in the direction of 
joining HCOs, the trend is clear—the health care system is quickly 
shifting away from one dominated by independent, private physicians 
to various models of integration.60 These fundamental changes in the 
 
56. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(a)(7)(A) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
57. See Goldsmith, supra note 2, at 33 (noting that the quality movement 
in health care and Medicare’s new payment reforms require physicians 
and their staffs to document their case records, leading to increased 
documentation time and supporting requirements). 
58. See Jackson Healthcare, A Tough Time for Physicians: 2012 
Medical Practice & Attitude Report 5 (2012) (stating that 
physicians leaving private practice cite the following reasons for their 
doing so: declining reimbursement, capitation, and unprofitable practice; 
business complexities and hassles; and overhead and high cost of doing 
business); Isaacs et al., supra note 6, at 656 (stating that the economic 
stresses of independent practice “has led a growing number of physicians 
to give up independent practice”). 
59. See Witt et al., supra note 17, at 3 (“As physicians increasingly 
seek . . . shelter from the demands and declining economies of private 
practice, the attractiveness of group practice or direct employment 
grows.”); Satiani & Vaccaro, supra note 23, at 1051 (stating that 
physicians are considering joining HCOs for greater economic security, 
peace of mind, and better work-life balance). 
60. See Michelle Hogan, Come Together: In Environment of Increasing 
Consolidation, Nephrologist Founds Independent Practice Association, 
Nephrology Times, Feb. 2001, at 7, 8 (“While the options for 
partnering with other medical providers come in all shapes and 
sizes, . . . in this day and age, some level of collaboration is 
unavoidable.”); Moore & Coddington, supra note 25, at 54 (“[M]ost care 
providers appear headed in the same general direction (i.e., toward 
greater integration and closer coordination) . . . .”). 
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organization and delivery of health care raise important questions 
regarding the impact of HCO organizational culture on physicians’ 
clinical decision making and, ultimately, on health care costs, quality, 
and rationing.  
II. Physician Decision Making  
To understand the influence of HCO organizational culture on the 
quality, modality, and cost of patient care, one must first understand 
how physicians make clinical decisions. Ideally the practice of 
medicine would involve a careful, systematic evaluation of a patient’s 
symptoms and conditions, with science providing a clear pathway 
toward diagnosis and treatment. The reality, though, often looks very 
different. As aptly described by Dr. David Eddy, “Uncertainty, biases, 
errors, and difference of opinions, motives, and values weaken every 
link in the chain that connects a patient’s actual condition to the 
selection of a diagnostic test or treatment.”61 The absence of clear 
answers as to the correct diagnosis and course of treatment means 
physicians instead must rely on their professional intuition.62 This 
Part explains that these judgments are guided by physicians’ 
cognitive frameworks, or schemas, that organize their knowledge, 
assumptions, and values. Part III then describes how an HCO’s 
organizational culture may impact physicians’ schemas and, 
ultimately, their clinical decisions. 
A. Uncertainty and Ambiguity in Medicine 
A physician-patient encounter begins with a patient presenting 
various complaints, signs, or symptoms.63 On the basis of these initial 
observations, the physician then must develop a diagnostic strategy 
and select a course of therapeutic treatment.64 Because diagnostic 
tests may expose patients to risk65 and involve time and expense, 
 
61. David M. Eddy, Variation in Physician Practice: The Role of 
Uncertainty, 3 Health Aff. 74, 75 (1984). 
62. See Floyd et al., supra note 29, at 238 (“[T]he delivery of health care 
relies significantly on the exercise of the physician’s expert professional 
judgement [sic].”). 
63. See Eddy, supra note 61, at 75 (“[A] large part of medicine is practiced 
on people who do not have obvious illnesses, but rather have signs, 
symptoms, or findings that may or may not represent an illness that 
should be treated.”). 
64. See Cheryl B. Travis et al., Judgment Heuristics and Medical Decisions, 
13 Patient Educ. & Counseling 211, 212 (1989) (identifying the 
three components of medical decision making as encompassing the 
“recognition and reporting of signs and symptoms, diagnostic strategy, 
and selection of treatment options”). 
65. See Thomas Schlich, Risk and Medical Innovation: A Historical 
Perspective, in The Risks of Medical Innovation 1, 1 (Thomas 
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physicians cannot order every conceivable test that may confirm or 
rule out a diagnosis. Similarly, once they make a diagnosis, physicians 
must select among available treatments. In choosing among 
alternative diagnostic tests and treatment therapies, a physician’s 
choice depends in part on her predictions—the probability a patient 
has a particular condition, the probability that a diagnostic procedure 
will yield useful information,66 the probability that a patient will 
benefit from a therapeutic intervention, or the probability that a 
procedure will lead to complications or death.67 Unfortunately, 
physicians frequently lack the necessary information to make such 
predictions.  
A major source of uncertainty in medicine is the lack of 
authoritative evidence and guidelines on the appropriate course of 
treatment.68 Ideally, researchers would rigorously test the effectiveness 
of available diagnostic tests and treatment therapies, yielding the 
information clinicians need to make informed decisions regarding a 
medical intervention’s utility and risks. Various obstacles, however, 
prevent doing so.69 Consequently, the domain in which authoritative 
 
Schlich & Ulrich Tröhler eds. 2006) (noting that diagnostic measures, as 
well as therapeutic and preventive measures, expose patients to 
potential harm “through anticipated and unanticipated negative 
consequences”). For example, a CT scan of the brain exposes a patient 
to a radiation dose that is the equivalent of 15–300 chest X-rays. See 
When to Say ‘Whoa!’ to Your Doctor: Common Tests and Treatments 
You Probably Don’t Need, Consumer Rep., June 2012, at 12, 13 
(discussing the risks associated with common diagnostic tests). 
66. See Travis et al., supra note 64, at 213 (“Decisions to request diagnostic 
tests or expert consultation . . . . are made on the basis of hypotheses 
regarding a probable diagnosis.”). 
67. See generally Neal V. Dawson & Hal R. Arkes, Systematic Errors in 
Medical Decision Making: Judgment Limitations, 2 J. Gen. Intern. 
Med. 183, 183 (1987) (“Daily medical practice depends heavily on the 
physician’s use of basic cognitive skills such as estimating probabilities 
of future outcomes . . . .”). 
68. See Amitabh Chandra et al., Who Ordered That? The Economics of 
Treatment Choices in Medical Care, in 2 Handbook of Health 
Economics 397, 402 (Mark V. Pauly et al. eds., 2012) (“In many 
clinical situations, there are no authoritative guidelines or consensus 
treatment recommendations.”)  
69. First, rigorous evaluation of a medical intervention’s effectiveness often 
is extremely expensive and sometimes raises serious ethical issues. See 
Jan R. Blustein & Theodore Marmor, Cutting Waste by Making Rules: 
Promises, Pitfalls, and Realistic Prospects, 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1543, 
1549 (1992) (describing some of the problems with clinical trials). In 
addition, a comprehensive evaluation of a particular medical 
intervention may require years of observation, leaving many new 
technologies inadequately researched prior to their adoption by 
clinicians. See Katherine H. Hall, Reviewing Intuitive Decision-Making 
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evidence guides clinicians’ professional judgments is quite small, with 
less than half of medical decisions supported by adequate evidence 
regarding an intervention’s effectiveness.70 Lacking this information, 
physicians frequently cannot judge an intervention’s probable 
outcomes.71 The availability of dozens of procedures for diagnosing or 
treating a condition only further complicates a physician’s task.72 The 
practice of medicine thus fairly can be characterized as one where 
 
and Uncertainty: The Implications for Medical Education, 36 Med. 
Educ. 216, 216–17 (2002) (“Many new technologies have not been 
adequately researched as to the best ways they can be utilised.”). 
Equally troubling, few studies track a treatment’s long-term impact on a 
patient’s health. See Barbara J. Evans, Seven Pillars of a New 
Evidentiary Paradigm: The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act Enters the 
Genomic Era, 85 Notre Dame L. Rev. 419, 44647 (2010) (noting 
that few clinical trials are of sufficient duration to allow for the 
detection of an intervention’s long-term effects on health). Moreover, 
when evidence of effectiveness does exist, sometimes studies point in 
different directions, with clinicians facing the challenge of sorting 
through conflicting or inconsistent results. See Eddy, supra note 61, at 
81 (explaining that clinicians are frequently left with a mixture of 
evidence, and that “evidence from different sources can easily go in 
different directions, [making it] virtually impossible for anyone to sort 
things out in his or her head”). Finally, even where clinical trials 
establish the benefits of a particular medical intervention, questions 
often remain regarding its utility relative to other options. See 
Clement J. McDonald, Medical Heuristics: The Silent Adjudicators of 
Clinical Practice, 124 Ann. Intern. Med. 56, 56 (1996) (discussing 
open issues regarding drug therapies); see also C. David Naylor, Grey 
Zones of Clinical Practice: Some Limits to Evidence-Based Medicine, 
345 Lancet 840, 840 (1995) (noting the incomplete or contradictory 
information about the benefits of competing clinical options).  
70. See Cong. Budget Office, Research on the Comparative 
Effectiveness of Medical Treatments: Issues and Options or 
an Expanded Federal Role 9 (2007); see also Brenda Sirovich et al., 
Discretionary Decision Making by Primary Care Physicians and the 
Cost of U.S. Health Care, 27 Health Aff. 813, 814 (2008) (discussing 
a review by BMJ’s Clinical Evidence finding that more than half of 
treatments for a variety of conditions fall into the gray zone of 
medicine). 
71. See Dawson & Arkes, supra note 67, at 183 (stating that daily medical 
practice depends heavily on physicians estimating probabilities of future 
outcomes, a task severely compromised by gaps in clinical evidence).  
72. See Eddy, supra note 61, at 78 (explaining that the task of selecting a 
procedure is complicated by the fact that “there are dozens of 
procedures that can be ordered, in any combination, at any time”); 
Naylor, supra note 69, at 840 (“Another difficulty arises from the 
Malthusian growth of uncertainty when multiple technologies are 
combined into clinical strategies.”). 
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clinicians regularly confront ambiguous choices regarding how best to 
manage their patients’ care.73 
A second source of uncertainty in medicine stems from variation 
among patients. Even when clinicians possess information on a 
treatment’s overall clinical effectiveness, the information only reveals 
average benefits and risks. Statistical projections based on large 
population averages, however, may hide significant variation among 
patients, as disparity in patient conditions and characteristics can 
cause a given intervention to affect patients differently.74 In addition, 
many clinical studies limit participation to only those patients 
meeting certain characteristics,75 raising questions about the 
generalizability of a study’s findings to those patient populations 
excluded from the study.76 As a result, a procedure or treatment’s 
potential clinical benefits and risks for an individual patient often 
remain uncertain.77 
 
73. See Robert Town et al., Assessing the Influence of Incentives on Physicians 
and Medical Groups, 61 Med. Care Res. & Rev. 80S, 91S (Supp. 2004) 
(“[P]hysicians are commonly confronted with ambiguous choices and 
feedback about both the illness and the treatment modality.”). 
74. See Henry J. Aaron, Waste, We Know You Are Out There, 359 New 
Eng. J. Med. 1865, 1866 (2008) (“A given intervention typically affects 
individual patients differently.”); Mantel, supra note 2, at 1420 
(discussing the limitations of clinical evidence given the variation in how 
a medical intervention affects particular patients). 
75. For example, an analysis of acute myocardial infarction medications 
found that the majority of studies excluded persons over a certain age. 
See Jerry H. Gurwitz et al., The Exclusion of the Elderly and Women 
from Clinical Trials in Acute Myocardial Infarction, 268 JAMA 1417, 
1417–20 (1992) (finding that a majority of studies—over sixty percent—
had age-based subject exclusions—some as low as age sixty-five—with 
the presence of age exclusions increasing over time). Clinical studies 
frequently exclude patients on the basis of age and other factors out of 
concern that these patients’ higher prevalence of comorbid conditions 
will increase the risk of side effects or other complications, resulting in 
poor outcomes not attributable to the studied medical intervention. This 
in turn could result in data that show a dilution of the beneficial effect 
of the drug studied, or raise the cost of a study by requiring a larger 
number of subjects. See id. at 1420–21 (discussing the reasons for 
excluding the elderly from clinical drug studies); McDonald, supra note 
69, at 56 (noting that rarely are scientific studies large enough to 
determine how variation in patient factors may alter the benefits or 
risks of a therapy). 
76. See Gurwitz et al., supra note 75, at 1420 (explaining that the exclusion 
of elderly patients from clinical trials of drugs used to treat acute 
myocardial infarction severely limits the ability to generalize study 
findings to elderly patients). 
77. See id. at 1421 (“[A] priori exclusion of the elderly [from clinical drug 
trials] prevents collection of the very data clinicians and researchers 
need to make informed decisions when treating this important 
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Ambiguity in medical decision making also stems from the 
inherent value choices in health care. Medical procedures frequently 
involve trade-offs between potential health benefits and risks. A 
medical intervention may yield useful diagnostic information, cure or 
ameliorate a disease, or increase a patient’s life expectancy, but it also 
may expose a patient to pain, anxiety, or risks such as complications 
or death.78 In addition, concerns about the rising cost of health care 
raise the additional question of whether a particular treatment 
represents a worthwhile use of society’s health care resources.79 All 
medical decisions, then, involve making trade-offs “[a]nd making 
tradeoffs involves values.”80  
Science cannot identify how best to balance the competing value 
choices underlying various medical decisions. Physicians instead must 
be guided by their own personal values (and those of their patients) 
when deciding the appropriate course of treatment. And because 
physicians vary as to how they value different outcomes, physicians 
make different trade-offs.81 For example, a physician who believes it is 
important to pursue every possible chance for survival, no matter how 
 
population.”); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost, The American Difference in 
Health Care Costs: Is There a Problem? Is Medical Necessity the 
Solution?, 43 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1, 15 (“Given the infinite variability of 
patients and conditions, it is often quite difficult to know with any 
precision how useful any test or procedure will be ex ante.”); Mantel, 
supra note 2, at 1420 (“[A] treatment’s potential clinical benefits for an 
individual patient often remain uncertain, with some care that, on 
average, is of no, or merely marginal, benefit potentially benefitting 
some patients.”).  
78. See Eddy, supra note 61, at 82 (“The basic problem is that any procedure 
has multiple outcomes, some good and some bad.”); Peter Juhn et al., 
Balancing Modern Medical Benefits and Risks, 26 Health Aff. 647, 647 
(2007) (“Therapeutic interventions can stop or slow the progression of 
serious diseases, prevent illnesses, or improve the quality of life for a 
patient . . . . [But] they can also present distinct and, at times, serious 
health risks.”). For example, chemotherapy may allow a patient to live 
longer, but it may decrease the patient’s quality of life. See Sidney T. 
Bogardus et al., Perils, Pitfalls, and Possibilities in Talking About Medical 
Risk, 281 JAMA 1037, 1038 (1999) (“[C]hemotherapy might allow a 
person to live longer with an otherwise incurable cancer. This added life 
expectancy might be a benefit to some people but for others, the extra 
time spent in discomfort would be a risk.”). 
79. See generally E. Haavi Morreim, Medicine Meets Resource Limits: 
Restructuring the Legal Standard of Care, 59 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 26 
(1997) (noting that medical decision making involves value choices, 
including “decisions about how much money is appropriate to spend” in 
an effort to achieve health-related goals). 
80. Eddy, supra note 61, at 82. 
81. See generally id. (noting variation in how people value a medical 
procedure’s different outcomes). 
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remote, may recommend that a patient undergo an unproven, 
experimental cancer therapy. In contrast, those placing higher value 
on competing concerns, such as patient comfort or efficient use of 
health care resources, may advise against such treatment.82  
A final source of uncertainty in clinical decision making arises 
from the complexity and breadth of information physicians must sort 
through in arriving at a diagnosis and plan of treatment. As explained 
by one commentator, “The final decision about how to manage a 
patient requires synthesizing all of the information about a disease, 
the patient, signs and symptoms, the effectiveness of dozens of tests 
and treatments; outcomes, and values.”83 Unfortunately, physicians 
rarely have the luxury of engaging in a comprehensive evaluation of a 
clinical problem.84 Rather than investigate all competing hypotheses 
generated by a patient’s symptoms, they instead focus on a limited 
set of possible diagnoses.85 Similarly, rather than conduct an 
exhaustive review of all the clinical evidence, physicians may settle on 
a diagnosis when they conclude there is “enough evidence to bring 
closure to the diagnostic process.”86 This lack of deep clinical analysis 
further introduces uncertainty into medical decision making, as 
physicians often make decisions based on an imprecise and incomplete 
assessment of the clinical problem.87  
The lack of scientific information on the optimal approach to 
diagnosis and treatment, the need to make difficult value trade-offs, 
and the challenges of processing complex and conflicting information 
 
82. See, e.g., Morreim, supra note 79, at 18–19 (discussing the value trade-
offs of ABMT for treating breast cancer). 
83. Eddy, supra note 61, at 83. 
84. See Hall, supra note 18, at 480 (noting that doctors often do not incorporate 
careful, systematic evaluations into their clinical decision making).  
85. See Bernard Charlin et al., Scripts and Medical Diagnostic Knowledge: 
Theory and Applications for Clinical Reasoning Instruction and 
Research, 75 Acad. Med. 182, 184 (2000) (stating that physicians 
consider the set of hypotheses representing the initial possibility he or 
she feels need to be pursued); see also David M. Eddy & Charles H. 
Clanton, The Art of Diagnosis: Solving the Clinicopathological Exercise, 
306 New Eng. J. Med. 1263, 1266 (1982) (explaining that if a 
physician believes a diagnosis is more likely than another possible 
diagnosis, the later may be dropped from further consideration). 
86. Charlin et al., supra note 85, at 185; see also Jerome P. Kassirer, 
Sounding Board: Our Stubborn Quest for Diagnostic Certainty, 
320 New Eng. J. Med. 1489, 1489 (1989) (stating that the physician’s 
task “is not to attain certainty, but rather to reduce the level of 
diagnostic uncertainty enough to make optimal therapeutic decisions”). 
87. See Kassirer, supra note 86, at 1489 (“Absolute certainty in diagnosis is 
unattainable, no matter how much information [physicians] gather, how 
many observations we make, or how many tests we perform.”). 
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means physicians regularly confront uncertain and ambiguous 
choices.88 Yet they must make clinical decisions despite lacking clear 
answers. As described in Part II.B, the manner in which a physician 
responds to this uncertainty and ambiguity is largely a function of 
intuitive expertise that shapes how she construes a clinical matter and 
the decision rules she applies.89  
B. The Role of Cognitive Schemas in Clinical Decision Making 
The field of cognitive psychology has shown that our judgments 
and decisions rarely result from conscious, deductive reasoning based 
on a systematic approach to the evidence.90 Our mental processing 
instead reflects the application of cognitive frameworks, or schemas, 
that organize our knowledge and beliefs about a situation.91 In the 
health care context, schemas provide the “personal decision rules” 
that physicians use to make clinical decisions, particularly in 
conditions of uncertainty.92 
 
88. See Town et al., supra note 73, at 91S (stating that ambiguities are an 
inevitable part of patient management, especially as “[t]here is often a 
lack of scientific information about the optimal approach to the 
diagnosis and treatment of many diseases, and physicians are commonly 
confronted with ambiguous choices and feedback about both the illness 
and the treatment modality”). 
89. See Hall, supra note 69, at 216 (“It is known that intuitive expertise 
requires a well organised store of networks and rules which allow 
efficient access and retrieval of information. These ‘personal decision 
rules’ are used by clinicians, particularly in conditions of 
uncertainty . . . .”); Town et al., supra note 73, at 91S (“A physician’s 
response to ambiguity will be a function of how he or she construes a 
situation and the rules available to respond to the situation.”). 
90. See generally Daniel Kahneman, Thinking Fast and Slow (2011) 
(providing a comprehensive discussion of how cognitive processing is 
primarily influenced by automatic, subconscious thought rather than 
conscious reasoning). 
91. See James L. Bowditch, Anthony F. Buono & Marcus M. 
Stewart, A Primer on Organizational Behavior, 45 (7th ed. 
2008) (“People often use schemas, cognitive frameworks that 
systematize our ‘knowledge’ about . . . other people, situations, objects, 
and . . . phenomena.”); Mark P. Higgins & Mary P. Tully, Hospital 
Doctors and Their Schemas About Appropriate Prescribing, 39 Med. 
Educ. 184, 185 (2005) (defining schemas as “ordered patterns of mental 
representations that encapsulate all our knowledge regarding specific 
objects, concepts or events”). 
92. Hall, supra note 69, at 216 (stating that schemas are “personal decision 
rules” used by physicians, particularly in conditions of uncertainty). 
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1. Cognitive Schemas 
Schemas are the mental processes triggered by a particular 
situation.93 Derived from our past experiences, societal roles, and 
personal morals,94 schemas organize the rules, assumptions, and values 
we apply to a given situation.95 In doing so, they provide cognitive 
shortcuts that operate outside of conscious awareness,96 eliminating 
the need for careful, systematic reasoning.97 Schemas thus can be 
understood as the intuitions that shape our judgments and actions.  
In organizing our knowledge and values in a systematic way, 
schemas help us navigate a situation. First, schemas guide the search 
for, acquisition of, and processing of information. Schemas dictate 
what information an individual retrieves from memory98 and direct 
which elements of a situation are attended to and which are ignored.99 
 
93. See John A. Bargh & Tanya L. Chartrand, The Unbearable Automaticity 
of Being, 54 Am. Psychologist 462, 462 (1999) (explaining that 
individuals’ mental processes are put into motion by features of the 
situation facing the individual); Linda K. Treviño et al., Behavioral Ethics 
in Organizations: A Review, 32 J. Mgmt. 951, 961 (2006) (stating that a 
situation triggers a script—a type of schema—that shapes the individual’s 
formation of judgment and intention to act). 
94. See Bowditch, Buono & Stewart, supra note 91, at 45 (“[S]chemas 
can reflect ourselves, . . . the roles we play, and events we experience.”); 
Stanley G. Harris, Organizational Culture and Individual Sensemaking: 
A Schema-Based Perspective, 5 Org. Sci. 309, 310 (1994) (stating that 
schemas are “from one’s experiences about how the world operates”). 
95. See Higgins & Tully, supra note 91, at 185 (defining schemas). 
96. See Bargh & Chartrand, supra note 93, at 462 (1999) (“[M]ost of a 
person’s everyday life is determined not by their conscious intentions 
and deliberate choices but by mental processes that are put into motion 
by features of the environment and that operate outside of conscious 
awareness and guidance.”); Dennis A. Gioia & Peter P. Poole, Scripts in 
Organizational Behavior, 9 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 449, 450, 454 (1984) 
(stating that schemas “have been shown to be basic elements of 
cognitive processing,” and that people are “not purely rational 
information processors”). 
97. See Hall, supra note 18, at 480 (explaining that heuristics, a type of 
schema, are “decisionmaking shortcuts [that] eliminate the need to 
reason from first principles and elemental facts in every case”); Hall, 
supra note 69, at 216 (describing intuition—or schemas—as “cognitive 
‘short-circuiting’”). 
98. See Charlin et al., supra note 85, at 183 (“[T]o give meaning to a new 
situation in our environment, we use prior knowledge that contains 
information about the characteristics and features of the 
situation . . . .”); Harris, supra note 94, at 310 (identifying one function 
of schemas as “direct[ing] information . . . retrieval from memory”). 
99. See Higgins & Tully, supra note 91, at 185 (“A schema can be viewed as 
a coded expectation about any aspect of an individual’s life, which 
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In addition, schemas help make sense of these elements by describing 
the relationships between them100 and by shaping an individual’s 
expectations about the situation.101 Schemas thus guide the knowledge 
an individual applies to a situation, as well as her perception and 
analysis of people and events.102 
Second, schemas guide an individual’s behavioral response to a 
situation. When a situation calls for action, a type of schema known 
as a script is triggered.103 As the term suggests, scripts facilitate action 
by incorporating knowledge of event sequences and specifying 
appropriate behavior.104 They therefore play an essential role in 
translating thought into action, influencing goal setting, planning, and 
execution.105 
Schemas thus reduce the cognitive complexity of decision making 
by providing simplified representations of people, events, or situations 
and by formulating action in the face of uncertainty.106 In essence, 
 
dictates which characteristics of a given event are attended to, which 
are stored for the future, and which are rejected as irrelevant.”). 
100. See Kimberly D. Elsbach et al., Identifying Situated Cognition in 
Organizations, 16 ORG. SCI. 422, 422 (2005) (“Schemas both constitute 
and structure knowledge by identifying those elements of a situation 
that are salient, and by describing the causal relations between them.”). 
101. See Peter P. Poole et al., Organizational Script Development Through 
Interactive Accommodation, 15 Group & Org. Stud. 212, 213 (1990) 
(explaining that schemas “can be viewed as cognitive models that 
provide structured expectations about people, situations, and events”); 
Charlin et al., supra note 85, at 183 (stating that schemas, such as 
scripts, contain “information about the relationships that link [a 
situation’s] characteristics and features”). 
102. See Harris, supra note 94, at 310 (stating that schemas “guide 
perception, memory, and inference”); Poole et al., supra note 101, at 213 
(explaining that the selected schema governs “the interpretation an 
individual gives to a situation”). 
103. See Poole et al., supra note 101, at 213 (“When behavior or action is a 
concern, a type of schema known as a script is called into play.”). 
104. See Gioia & Poole, supra note 96, at 449 (“A script is a schematic 
knowledge structure held in memory that specifies behavior or event 
sequences that are appropriate for specific situations.”); Poole et al., 
supra note 101, at 213–14 (explaining that scripts “aid[ ] in 
comprehension, coordination, and task accomplishment” by reflecting 
“knowledge of behavior, action, and event sequences”). 
105. See Harris, supra note 94, at 310 (stating that schemas “facilitate 
anticipations of the future, goal setting, planning and goal execution”). 
106. See Elsbach et al., supra note 100, at 422 (“[Schemas] serve as simplified 
representations of knowledge, and, as such, as a means for simplifying 
cognition . . . .”); see also Gioia & Poole, supra note 96, at 454 (stating 
that schemas such as scripts “are heuristic knowledge structures that aid 
in reducing the cognitive complexity of decision making”); Higgins & 
Tully, supra note 91, at 185 (“Schema theorists argue that each 
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schemas serve as mental maps that enable individuals to quickly 
orient themselves to and navigate a situation.107 In doing so, they 
promote more efficient decision making by reducing the need to 
devote intensive thought and logic to each and every situation.108 
Schemas are especially important in facilitating decision making in 
conditions of uncertainty because they fill gaps in the available 
information and provide a template for action.109 Not surprisingly, 
then, the schemas utilized by health professions significantly impact 
their clinical decisions, particularly when the medical science provides 
no clear answer. 
2. Physicians’ Use of Cognitive Schemas  
When confronted with uncertainty and ambiguous clinical choices, 
a physician’s response is a function of her personal cognitive 
schemas.110 Beginning with the diagnostic process, schemas allow a 
clinician to efficiently perceive the relevant elements of the patient’s 
situation, generate hypotheses as to the causes of the patient’s 
complaints, and strategically gather additional data for making a 
diagnosis.111 Prior to ordering diagnostic tests or initiating therapeutic 
treatments, physicians first must have “a rough idea about what is 
occurring.”112 This begins with schemas focusing the physician’s 
attention on certain attributes of the patient’s situation—specific 
patient symptoms, details from the patient’s medical history, and 
 
individual constructs a system of schemas and subschemas that are 
connected in a way that enables that individual to deal effectively with 
their world.”). 
107. See Harris, supra note 94, at 310 (“Schemas serve as mental maps which 
enable individuals to traverse and orient themselves within their 
experiential terrain.”). 
108. See Gioia & Poole, supra note 96, at 453 (explaining that schemas such 
as scripts reduce the need to devote “equally intensive thought to all 
actions,” with some situations requiring “little or no conscious 
processing”); Harris, supra note 94, at 310 (schemas are “used by 
individuals to encode and represent incoming information efficiently”). 
109. See Harris, supra note 94, at 310 (stating that schemas “guide filling 
gaps in the information available” and “provide templates for problem 
solving”); see also Elsbach et al., supra note 100, at 422 (stating that, in 
providing representations of knowledge, schemas “[simplify] cognition in 
conditions of incomplete information”). 
110. See Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1019 (“[U]ncertain clinical situations will 
force physicians to rely on judgment, habit, and personal practice style 
in deciding how to treat patients.”).  
111. See Charlin et al., supra note 85, at 186 (explaining that scripts provide 
“a mental model of the situation, which allows the clinician to efficiently 
generate hypotheses and strategically gather data”). 
112. Id. at 183. 
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features of the patient’s environment.113 In doing so, the clinician 
quickly develops a representation of the situation that in turn 
“activates networks of knowledge,” or schemas, that both describe the 
possible relationship between key observations and generate 
hypotheses regarding the patient’s condition.114 Schemas also direct 
the course of action a physician takes to validate a hypothesis, such 
as what further inquiries to make of the patient or which diagnostic 
tests to order.115  
Schemas also help the clinician navigate the clinical uncertainty 
that surrounds the diagnostic process. Ideally, a particular diagnosis 
will explain all of a patient’s symptoms and signs. In practice, 
however, a patient’s symptoms and signs often do not perfectly match 
the hypothesized diagnosis.116 The physician then must decide whether 
clinical observations that cannot be explained by a diagnosis are 
simply atypical features or discordant facts requiring consideration of 
alternative hypotheses.117 A physician’s cognitive schemas guide this 
evaluation.118 Similarly, because physicians cannot order every 
 
113. See id. at 182–83 (describing how a physician’s scripts “give meaning to 
a new situation” and “direct[ ] the selection . . . of information”); see 
also Eddy & Clanton, supra note 85, at 1265 (explaining that physicians 
apply heuristic devices that lead them to focus on certain findings, 
temporarily ignoring other findings). 
114. See Charlin et al., supra note 85, at 184 (explaining that physicians 
quickly build “a representation of the situation that initiates the 
direction and scope of the reasoning process;” that “within moments 
hypotheses pop into the physician’s mind as possible explanations for 
the patient’s problem;” that these hypotheses, “which are usually a 
product of the clinician’s past experiences and knowledge, appear 
quickly; and that their activation is an ‘unconscious act of memory 
association’”); see also Eddy & Clanton, supra note 85, at 1265 (stating 
that the application of a heuristic device leads the physician to focus on 
a limited number of findings, or pivots, which then generate a realm of 
possible diagnoses). 
115. See Charlin et al., supra note 85, at 182–85 (describing the application 
of scripts to the diagnostic process). 
116. See id. at 186 (“[P]atient clinical features never perfectly match the 
attributes of an illness scripts [sic] . . . .”). 
117. See Eddy & Clanton, supra note 85, at 1266 (explaining that a 
preliminary clinical diagnosis may not explain some findings and quoting 
a discussant’s comment that prior to accepting the diagnosis, the 
physician must ask whether there are “atypical features or discordant 
facts” and determine whether other diagnoses should be considered).  
118. See Charlin et al., supra note 85, at 186 (explaining that “scripts work 
in such a way that a physician makes a ‘reasoned decision’ about why 
some expectations are violated” and that, in script processing for 
assessment of a fit, physicians must determine whether there are 
reasonable explanations for these departures). 
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conceivable test that may confirm or rule out a diagnosis,119 they must 
determine when they have sufficient evidence to support a working 
diagnosis and when to seek additional confirming evidence or explore 
alternative hypotheses. Schemas again guide this determination.120 
In addition to directing the diagnostic process, schemas also guide 
a physician’s choice and implementation of a patient’s treatment plan. 
As previously noted, schemas reflect a physician’s knowledge about a 
disease and thus shape a physician’s predictions about a patient’s 
prognosis or the efficacy of various therapeutic interventions.121 
Importantly, schemas reflect the scientific assumptions given primacy 
by a physician, which in turn impact her patient management 
decisions.  
To illustrate the influence of a physician’s underlying assumptions 
on her professional judgment, consider the treatment of patients who 
exhibit only mild or even no symptoms of their disease. When 
patients with a disease exhibit no or mild symptoms, there may be 
uncertainty as to whether to treat the disease with aggressive medical 
interventions, such as surgery, or instead pursue a strategy of 
“watchful waiting.”122 If the physician recommends surgery or other 
risky procedures, she may do so on the assumption that the patient’s 
condition will worsen over time, and thus the patient will require the 
 
119. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. 
120. See generally Charlin et al., supra note 85, at 185 (discussing the impact 
of scripts on the diagnostic process and the fact that physicians often 
base their diagnoses on less-than-complete evidence, “assum[ing] that 
other values[—that is, other signs, symptoms, or attributes associated 
with a condition—]are present [without] specifically check[ing] them”). 
121. See id. at 183 (after arriving at a diagnosis, a clinician “can use related 
knowledge to take actions, such as providing a prognosis . . . or 
instituting a treatment”). 
122. See, e.g., Raphael Rosenhek, Watchful Waiting for Severe Mitral 
Regurgitation, 23 Seminars Thoracic & Cardiovascular Surgery 
203, 206 (2011) (“There is an ongoing debate as to whether 
asymptomatic patients with severe mitral regurgitation should be 
operated [on] in the absence of symptoms.”); A.R. Brady et al., Long-
Term Outcomes of Immediate Repair Compared with Surveillance of 
Small Abdominal Aortic Aneurysms, 346 New Eng. J. Med. 1445 
(2002) (finding “no long-term difference in mean survival between early-
surgery and surveillance groups”); see also Study: Watchful Waiting, 
Not Surgery, Sometimes Best for Abdominal Aortic Aneurysms, Heart 
Disease Wkly., June 23, 2002, at 13, available at http://www.newsrx.c
om/newsletters/Heart-Disease-Weekly/2002-06-23/20020623333142W.html 
(quoting a researcher from the 2002 New England Journal of Medicine as 
stating, “There has been uncertainty in the medical community about 
which patients with abdominal aortic aneurysms are likely to benefit 
from elective surgery.”). 
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procedure eventually.123 The physician also may assume that a later-
performed procedure would prove more risky due to factors such as 
the patient’s increased age or advancement of the disease.124 In 
contrast, physicians favoring watchful waiting may believe that 
patients should not be exposed to the risks associated with a 
procedure unless absolutely necessary125 or that the passage of time 
may bring technological breakthroughs that reduce the procedure’s 
risks or increase the chance of a favorable outcome.126  
Differences in physicians’ underlying beliefs may also account for 
variation in physicians’ drug-prescribing practices. For example, 
physicians favoring newer drugs over older drugs may assume that 
newer is usually better.127 Other physicians, however, may follow the 
rule “never use a new drug when an old drug will do” because they 
believe new drugs may pose unknown dangers to patients.128 As these 
examples illustrate, variation in physicians’ practices often can be 
attributed to differences in the assumptions incorporated into 
physicians’ schemas. 
Schemas also impact how physicians resolve the ambiguity arising 
from the value trade-offs inherent in most medical decisions. A 
physician’s schema guides the physician toward specific clinical 
alternatives by elevating certain values while minimizing others. For 
example, a schema may lead a physician to focus on whether a 
treatment will extend a patient’s life, ignoring or minimizing other 
concerns such as pain and disability, risks of health complications, 
and financial costs.129 Similarly, physicians’ reliance on simplifying 
 
123. See McDonald, supra note 69, at 60 (discussing the assumptions 
underpinning arguments for elective surgery). 
124. See id; see also Alice Goodman, Follicular Lymphoma: Is Watchful 
Waiting Still a Treatment Option in Era of New and Improved 
Therapy?, Oncology News Int’l, Mar. 2010, at 20, 20. (stating that 
“one argument for starting therapy immediately [for the treatment of 
follicular lymphoma is the concern] “that delaying therapy will lead to 
problems such as irreversible organ damage, resistant disease, 
transformation, and less robust response to delayed therapy”). 
125. See id. (stating that an advantage of waiting before initiating certain 
therapies may “include delaying acute and late adverse effects of 
therapy”). 
126. See McDonald, supra note 69, at 61 (discussing considerations on the 
side of watchful waiting rather than recommending elective surgery). 
127. See id. at 59 (discussing the reasons that new drugs often quickly 
become the preferred drugs in their class). 
128. See id. at 59–60 (highlighting the concerns justifying the rule “never use 
a new drug when an old drug will do”).  
129. See Eddy, supra note 61, at 82 (discussing value trade-offs in medical 
decision making). 
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maxims, known as heuristics,130 directs them toward choices that 
promote certain values over others.131 As Dr. Eddy explains: 
Anyone uncomfortable dealing with probabilities can use the 
heuristic, “If there is any chance of (the disease), the 
(procedure) should be performed.” If one cannot estimate the 
number of people to be saved, one can use the heuristic, “If but 
one patient is saved, the effort is worthwhile.” If one cannot 
contemplate alternative uses of resources that might deliver a 
greater benefit to a population, there is the heuristic, “Costs 
should not be considered in decisions about individual 
patients.”132 
Schemas accordingly play a central role in the balance physicians 
strike among the competing considerations arising in the patient-care 
setting.  
As the preceding discussion shows, schemas guide physicians’ 
professional judgments, enabling them to make choices in the face of 
uncertainty and ambiguity. In the absence of clear clinical guidelines, 
patient-care decisions are largely determined by the schemas directing 
a physician’s cognitive processing. For this reason, it is of 
fundamental importance that we understand the influences shaping 
physicians’ schemas. Part III explores one such influence—an HCO’s 
organizational culture. 
III. The Impact of Organizational Culture on 
Physicians’ Clinical Decision Making 
As discussed in Part II, physicians’ clinical decisions are guided 
by their cognitive schemas, which reflect a physician’s values and 
beliefs. Because physicians generally are afforded significant autonomy 
when making clinical decisions,133 it may be that their schemas are 
shaped largely by their training and the norms of the medical 
professional generally.134 The insights of organizational sociologists, 
 
130. Heuristics are rules or guidelines that are applied for the purpose of 
simplifying complex tasks and decisions. See Hall, supra note 69, at 219 
(defining heuristics).  
131. See Travis et al., supra note 64, at 212 (stating that “heuristics . . . 
influence . . . preferences among alternatives” and impact “selection of 
treatment options”). 
132. Eddy, supra note 61, at 85; see also Hall, supra note 69, at 219 (describing 
similar medical mottos that simplify physicians’ decision making). 
133. See Town et al., supra note 73, at 87S (noting that “physicians practice 
with much autonomy”); Floyd et al., supra note 29, at 239 (noting that 
the complexity of medicine and its reliance on professional intuition 
“requires clinical autonomy”).  
134. Health professionals’ education and training involve a rigorous 
socialization process, with clinicians generally internalizing the dominant 
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however, teach us that people do not make decisions in a vacuum but 
are influenced by situational variables, including organizational 
culture.135  
An organization’s culture manifests itself both formally and 
informally. At the more visible level are an organization’s formal 
structures, processes, and espoused values.136 These include the 
organization’s financial-incentive structures, methods of performance 
assessment, mission statement, and ethical guidelines.137 Of greater 
influence, however, is an organization’s informal culture, that is, the 
“taken for granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts and feelings.”138 
Together, an organization’s formal and informal culture significantly 
influence its employees’ decisions, perhaps even more than the 
professional norms and personal values an employee brings to the 
workplace.139 
Applying organizational theories to health care leads to the 
conclusion that physicians embedded within HCOs are part of an 
organizational dynamic that powerfully influences the physicians’ 
clinical judgments.140 Specifically, HCOs’ organizational cultures 
 
beliefs and norms of their profession. See Town et al., supra note 73, at 
85S (“Medical education includes one of the most intense socialization 
processes of any profession, and the products of these programs bring 
strong professional values to the practice setting.”).  
135. See generally Lynne L. Dallas, Corporate Ethics in the Health Care 
Marketplace, 3 Seattle J. for Soc. Jus. 213, 215 (2004) (explaining 
that “most people’s behavior is affected by situational variables”).  
136. See Edgar H. Schein, The Corporate Culture Survival Guide 
21–27 (new & rev. ed. 2009) (describing the three levels of 
organizational culture). 
137. See id. at 39–40 exhib.3.1; see also Bowditch, Buono & Stewart, 
supra note 91, at 327, 329 (explaining that a firm’s shared values 
include “guidelines as to acceptable behaviors” and “formal statements 
of organizational philosophy, creeds, and charters”); Huw T. O. Davies, 
et al., Organisational Culture and Quality of Health Care, 9 Quality in 
Health Care 111, 114 (2000) (stating culture artifacts of the medical 
profession include methods of performance assessment). 
138. See Schein, supra note 136, 21 fig.2.1 (defining an organization’s 
informal culture as its underlying assumptions); see also Davies, supra 
note 137 (explaining that assumptions “are the basic ‘taken for granted’ 
views of the world and how one can understand and intervene in it”). 
139. See Bowditch, Buono & Stewart, supra note 91, at 4 (“As studies have 
found, a company’s culture and values often have a greater influence on 
work-related decisions than the personal values of its employees.”).  
140. See Timothy J. Hoff, The Physician as Worker: What It Means and 
Why Now?, Health Care Mgmt. Rev., Fall 2001, at 53, 63 (noting 
that when physicians come to practice alongside others, we might expect 
them “to cultivate new mental models within which physicians enact 
their clinical roles”); cf. Henry J. Silverman, Organization Ethics in the 
Healthcare Organization: Proactively Managing the Ethical Climate to 
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profoundly influence both how physicians perceive patients’ situations 
and the thought patterns, attitudes, and values physicians apply 
when making clinical decisions.  
Although the empirical research on this issue is limited, several 
studies suggest that physicians conform to the norms of the 
organizations where they practice. For example, studies have found 
that for physicians who admit patients to two or more hospitals, their 
patients’ stays in a particular hospital are similar in length when 
compared to the usual practice at that hospital.141 In other words, a 
physician adapts her practices to the norm of the hospital where the 
patient is admitted, admitting her patients for longer periods of time 
in the hospital with the longer average length of stay and discharging 
her patients sooner from the hospital with the shorter average length 
of stay, even after controlling for differences in patient characteristics. 
Such studies support the hypothesis that the organizational setting 
has a significant impact on physicians’ cognitive schemas; otherwise, 
one would expect a physician to have a consistent practice style 
across hospital settings.142 
This Part sets forth a theory for how an HCO’s organizational 
culture shapes its affiliated physicians’ cognitive schemas and, 
ultimately, their clinical decisions. Although various structural aspects 
of an HCO impact physician’s patient-care decisions,143 this Article 
 
Ensure Organizational Integrity, 12 HEC F. 202, 204–05 (2000) 
(arguing that because of the influence of the contextual aspects of 
healthcare institutions on physicians’ behavior, the “moral dimensions of 
patient care need to be conceptualized as being largely influenced by 
organizational dynamics”). 
141. See Judith D. de Jong et al., Variation in Hospital Length of Stay: Do 
Physicians Adapt Their Length of Stay Decisions to What is Usual in 
the Hospital Where They Work?, 41 Health Servs. Res. 374 (2006) 
(comparing lengths of stay for U.S. physicians admitting patients to two 
or more hospitals); Gert P. Westert et al., Variation in Duration of 
Hospital Stay Between Hospitals and Between Doctors Within Hospitals, 
37 SOC. SCI. MED. 833 (1993) (similar study looking at Dutch 
physicians).  
142. See de Jong et al., supra note 141, at 388 (arguing that their findings of 
variation in lengths of stay across hospitals for the same physician 
support the hypothesis that organizational circumstances have a 
profound influence on clinical decisions).  
143. Organizational structural aspects that may impact or constrain 
physicians’ patient-care decisions include the availability of resources 
and specialists, the extent to which providers make use of health 
information technology, and work flow processes. For example, a limited 
supply of hospitals beds may lead physicians to treat patients outside 
the hospital setting, while limited access to specialists may lead primary 
care physicians to treat patients themselves rather than refer patients to 
specialists for more intensive, technology-driven treatments. See 
generally Mary Rorty, Introduction to Organization Issues in Clinical 
Ethics, in Developing Organization Ethics in Healthcare: A 
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focuses on the beliefs, norms, and values as reflected in an HCO’s 
organizational culture. Part III.A discusses the influence exerted by a 
physician’s organizational peers, particularly in conditions of 
uncertainty. Part III.B then explains how a physician’s organizational 
identification with an HCO may lead her to incorporate the HCO’s 
norms, values, and goals into her schemas. Finally, Part III.C draws 
on the theory of motivated cognition to explain how a physician’s self-
interest, as affected by the HCO, subconsciously biases her clinical 
judgments.  
A. The Influence of Organizational Peers 
Research shows that within the group setting, leaders, role 
models, and other peers exert strong influence over individuals’ 
norms, values, attitudes, and behavior.144 This process generally occurs 
unconsciously, with individuals largely unaware of the impact of their 
peers on their thinking.145 Physicians are no different, with 
commentators long observing the sway physicians hold over one 
another.146 For physicians affiliated with HCOs, then, their clinical 
 
Case-Based Approach to Policy, Practice, and Compliance 49, 
51 (Ann E. Mills et al. eds., 2001) (stating that physicians “ma[k]e 
accommodations for organizational strictures” such as “the range of 
available . . . treatments” and “restrictions on access to specialists”). 
144. See Michael W. Grojean et al., Leaders, Values, and Organizational 
Climate: Examining Leadership Strategies for Establishing an 
Organizational Climate Regarding Ethics, 55 J. Bus. Ethics 223, 224 
(2004) (explaining how organizational leaders influence other 
organizational members’ perceptions and norms); Lynne L. Dallas, A 
Preliminary Inquiry into the Responsibility of Corporations and Their 
Officers and Directors for Corporate Climate: The Psychology of 
Enron’s Demise, 35 Rutgers L. J. 1, 21 22 (2003) (commenting that 
the beliefs and values of others within an organization are often better 
predictors of an individual’s behavior than the beliefs the individual 
brought to the organization).  
145. See Mary Douglas, How Institutions Think 13 (1986) (“The 
individual within the collective is never, or hardly ever, conscious of the 
prevailing thought style which almost always exerts an absolutely 
compulsive force upon his thinking . . . .” (quoting Ludwik Fleck, 
Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact 41 (Thaddeus J. 
Trenn & Robert K. Merton eds., Fred Bradley & Thaddeus J. Trenn 
trans., University of Chicago Press 1979) (1935)); Milton C. Regan, Jr., 
Moral Intuitions and Organizational Culture, 51 St. Louis U. L.J. 941, 
959 (2007) (stating that the process of looking to peers, especially in 
situations of ambiguity, is a “process of unconscious influence”). 
146. See, e.g., Catherine Borbas, et al., The Role of Clinical Opinion Leaders 
in Guideline Implementation and Quality Improvement, 118 CHEST 
24S, 26S (Supp. 2000) (noting that interpersonal relationships among 
physicians is the most important fact in determining physicians’ 
adoption of medical innovations and refinements of medical practice, 
with local, informal medical opinion being of particular importance); 
 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 2·2013 
The Myth of the Independent Physician 
488 
decisions likely will reflect the practice style and philosophy of their 
HCO colleagues.  
1. Physicians’ Modeling of Their Peers 
Peers exert their greatest influence on an individual’s cognitive 
schemas in situations of uncertainty.147 Situations of uncertainty cause 
unease because individuals can never be sure that their decisions 
represent the best or right choice. Modeling one’s peers, however, can 
minimize this discomfort, as “safety in numbers” provides reassurance 
that the correct decision has been made.148 Conforming to one’s peers 
also permits individuals to delude themselves into believing that an 
ambiguous situation is not in fact ambiguous, further providing a false 
sense of security.149 
Because physicians commonly confront uncertainty when making 
clinical decisions, not surprisingly they take safety in following the 
example of their peers.150 For example, if a physician’s peers generally 
treat a disease aggressively, the physician can take comfort in 
following her peer’s aggressive approach. Similarly, if her peers believe 
newer drugs generally are superior to older drugs, a physician also 
likely will favor the newer drugs.  
When faced with uncertainty, individuals also may look to their 
peers for guidance because it is efficient to do so. As explained by 
Professors Thomas Jones and Lori Verstegen Ryan, 
[L]earning would be both slow and risky if individuals learned 
only by direct experience; their own experiences would not be 
extensive enough to allow learning at a significant pace and 
 
Rita Mano-Negrin & Brian Mittman, Theorizing the Social Within 
Physician Decision Making, 15 J. Mgmt. Med. 259, 261 (2001) 
(discussing the importance of peer influences on physician behavior). 
147. See Mano-Negrin & Mittman, supra note 147, at 261 (“Peer influence is 
greatest in situations characterized by high levels of uncertainty, where 
objective, unambiguous information is not readily available.”). 
148. See Eddy, supra note 61, at 85–86 (“[In the face of great uncertainty], 
the safest and most comfortable position is to do what others are doing. 
The applicable maxim is ‘safety in numbers.’”); cf. Samia A. Hurst et 
al., How Physicians Face Ethical Difficulties: A Qualitative Analysis, 
31 J. Med. Ethics 7 (2005) (stating that when individuals face difficult 
ethical issues, they look for assistance in part “[t]o obtain reassurance 
that the correct decision was being made”). 
149. Cf. Hall, supra note 69, at 218 (stating that conforming to one’s peers 
provides physicians with a false sense of certainty, as it “allows a 
(mostly unconscious) escape from having to face up to uncertainty, as 
well as engendering a (conscious or unconscious) feeling of security”).  
150. See Eddy, supra note 61, at 86 (commenting that physicians take 
“safety in numbers” and do what others are doing). 
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their mistakes could result in hazardous situations. Much social 
learning, therefore, takes place through modeling.151 
Imitating others also economizes decision making by allowing 
individuals to avoid the time and effort of acquiring information and 
comparing alternatives.152  
Extending this theory to the clinical setting would suggest that 
physicians have a strong propensity to imitate their peers or role 
models for reasons of efficiency. Given the high stakes and complexity 
involved in medical decision making, learning through direct 
experience is both slow and risky.153 In addition, few physicians have 
the time to determine the efficacy of various procedures through 
careful research and experiment. For example, in deciding whether to 
prescribe a new drug over an older drug, a physician may model the 
prescribing practices of peers or trusted role models in order to take 
advantage of others’ clinical experience with or research on the drugs. 
Modeling other physicians thus allows physicians to learn while 
avoiding potentially hazardous learning trials or time-consuming 
research and experiments.  
Physicians also may model their peers for other utilitarian 
reasons—namely to secure monetary and nonmonetary rewards. Most 
individuals desire to enhance their financial status and thus are 
 
151. Thomas M. Jones & Lori Verstegen Ryan, The Effect of Organizational 
Forces on Individual Morality: Judgment, Moral Approbation, and 
Behavior, 8 BUS. ETHICS Q. 431, 436 (1998); see also Ralph Hertwig & 
Stefan M. Herzog, Fast and Frugal Heuristics: Tools of Social 
Rationality, 27 SOC. COGNITION 661, 686 (2009) (“Social learning in the 
form of imitation (or, relatedly, advice giving) allows individuals to 
learn . . . without engaging in potentially hazardous learning 
trials . . . .”). 
152. See Gerd Gigerenzer, Rationality for Mortals: How People 
Cope with Uncertainty 30 (2008) (noting that imitation may be 
“ecologically rational” when “it is hard or time-consuming to figure out 
whether a choice is good or bad”); Mark Pingle, Imitation Versus 
Rationality: An Experimental Perspective on Decision Making, 24 J. 
Socio-Econ. 281, 281 (1995) (“Rather than comparing alternatives 
before making a choice, decision makers often simply imitate the choices 
made by others. Imitation may be advantageous when comparing 
alternatives is relatively costly.”). 
153. Cf. Mary A. Burke et al., Physician Social Networks and Geographical 
Variation in Medical Care 2 (Ctr. on Soc. Econ. & Dynamics, Working 
Paper No. 33, 2003), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/ 
research/files/reports/2003/7/healthcare%20burke/07healthcare_burke.pdf 
(“The correct diagnosis and treatment for a patient can be complicated, and 
there may be an opportunity to take advantage of the experience of 
others.”). Physicians also may conform to the practice norms of those 
around them to protect themselves against claims of malpractice; such 
norms often are the prevailing legal standard of care. See id. 
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motivated by pecuniary rewards such as higher wages and bonuses.154 
Individuals also care about nonmonetary rewards like prestige and 
professional advancement.155 They therefore pay close attention to the 
rewards and esteem bestowed on others, modeling their behavior after 
organizational leaders and role models in the hopes of securing for 
themselves monetary and professional rewards.156  
A final reason for peers’ influence stems from individuals’ 
powerful need for meaningful social relationships. The fundamental 
motive to belong or fit in causes individuals to desire others’ approval, 
as approval is a prerequisite for maintaining interpersonal bonds.157 
Consequently, individuals generally conform their attitude and 
behavior to the group’s norms in order to ensure the continuation of 
the social relationships that come with group membership.158  
This theory would predict that physicians adopt the practice 
styles and philosophies of their group peers in order to secure their 
approval, or at least to avoid their disapproval. In fact, physicians are 
known to value their colleagues’ esteem and will avoid clinical 
decisions that may evoke criticism from peers.159 For example, in a 
survey of cardiologists, not only did twenty-seven percent of 
 
154. See Aaron Ahuvia, If Money Doesn’t Make Us Happy, Why Do We Act As 
If It Does?, 29 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 491, 499 (2008) (discussing the desire 
for money and the positive feelings that come from receiving money). 
155. See Harvey S. James, Jr., Reinforcing Ethical Decision Making Through 
Organizational Structure, 28 J. BUS. ETHICS 43, 46–47 (2000) (“Non-
monetary incentives consist of promotions [and] public 
recognition . . . .”). 
156. See Jones & Ryan, supra note 151, at 436–37 (“Individuals learn by 
observing behavior in others and favoring that which has functional 
value—i.e., that which has been rewarded. They are motivated to model 
their behavior on this favored behavior because they hope to secure 
similar rewards.”).  
157. See Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire 
for Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 
117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 498 (1995) (stating that the need for approval 
is “undoubtedly linked to the fact that approval is a prerequisite for 
forming and maintaining social bonds”). 
158. See Bowditch, Buono & Stewart, supra note 91, at 155 (stating “that 
the desire to be accepted by the group can make individuals susceptible to 
conformity effects,” with individuals “experienc[ing] strong pressure to 
change their attitudes and behaviors to conform to the group’s norm(s) or 
operative standard(s)”); Regan, supra note 145, at 959 (explaining that the 
unconscious influence of others stems from the need to belong, which makes 
people sensitive to what others think and feel). 
159. See Town et al., supra note 73, at 93S (commenting that peer approval, 
as well as other nonfinancial considerations, may have a strong impact 
on a physician’s behavior); Eddy, supra note 61, at 86 (“A physician 
who follows the practices of his or her colleagues is safe from 
criticism . . . .”). 
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respondents report ordering a cardiac catheterization if a colleague in 
the same situation would do so, but some physicians acknowledged 
having ordered potentially unnecessary cardiac catheterizations in 
order to meet peer expectations.160  
2. Looking to Peers Within the HCO 
The discussion in Part III.A.1 suggests that a physician’s 
cognitive schemas are significantly influenced by her peers within her 
HCO. Physicians, however, belong to a number of groups, perhaps the 
most important being the medical profession. Having been socialized 
to abide by the norms of the profession throughout their medical 
education and training, physicians take great pride in fulfilling these 
norms and suffer guilt and shame when violating the profession’s 
norms.161 Similarly, physicians care deeply about their standing in the 
profession.162 In situations of uncertainty, then, they may look to their 
peers within the profession rather than modeling their peers within 
their HCO. This raises the question of whether a physician’s cognitive 
schemas primarily reflect the influence of her peers within her HCO or 
the medical profession generally.  
As physicians increasingly provide care under the auspices of 
larger, more integrated organizations, they are likely to identify more 
strongly with their organizational peers, rather than the profession as 
a whole. First, individuals primarily model or imitate what they see, 
and what they see most often is what others around them are doing.163 
As HCOs move toward tighter clinical integration, this increasingly 
will bring physicians into closer proximity to one another and 
 
160. See Frances Lee Lucas et al., Variation in Cardiologists’ Propensity to 
Test and Treat: Is It Associated with Regional Variation in Utilization?, 
3 Circulation: Cardiovascular Quality & Outcomes 253, 253 
(2010) (reporting results of survey of cardiologists). 
161. Gail B. Agrawal, Resuscitating Professionalism: Self-Regulation in the 
Medical Marketplace, 66 Mo. L. Rev. 341, 391 (2001); see also Town et al., 
supra note 73, at 85S (“Medical education includes one of the most intense 
socialization processes of any profession, and the products of these programs 
bring strong professional values to the practice setting.”). 
162. See William M. Sage, Reputation, Malpractice Liability, and Medical 
Error, in Accountability: Patient Safety and Policy Reform 
159, 164 (Virginia A. Sharpe ed., 2004) (discussing why physicians 
consider reputation important); Agrawal, supra note 161, at 392 (noting 
the importance of professional reputation to physicians). 
163. See Albert Bandura, Social Cognitive Theory, in 2 Encyclopedia of 
Industrial and Organizational Psychology 729, 729 (Steven G. 
Rogelberg ed., 2007) (“Much human learning relies on the models in 
one’s immediate environment.”); Albert Bandura, Observational 
Learning, in 8 International Encyclopedia of Communication 
3359, 3360 (Wolfgang Donsbach ed., 2008) (“Some of the observational 
learning is based on the models in the environment one inhabits.”). 
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facilitate a teamwork approach to patient care.164 We therefore would 
expect physicians affiliated with HCOs—particularly HCOs that 
emphasize clinical integration—to primarily model their HCO 
colleagues.  
Second, as noted in Part III.A.1, individuals conform to group 
norms in order to maintain and strengthen their social relationships 
with other group members.165 This conformity effect may be 
particularly strong in the workplace setting, as the social relationships 
formed among work colleagues are often highly valued given the 
significant time colleagues spend with one another.166 Indeed, the 
influence of peers in the workplace strengthens when workplace 
interactions are of greater frequency and intensity.167 Thus, given the 
frequent collaborations among HCO physicians, physicians affiliated 
with HCOs will likely look to their organizational peers for guidance 
rather than the profession generally.168  
Several studies support the theory that a physician’s peers within 
the HCO exert greater influence over the physician’s schemas than 
the profession generally. For example, one study found that surgeons 
adopt new procedures more quickly when a peer at the same hospital 
 
164. Cf. Burns & Muller, supra note 31, at 386 (“Structures that foster 
‘shoulder-to-shoulder’ practice are thought to increase communication, 
information transfer, learning, and consultation among physicians.”). 
165. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text. 
166. See Evan M. Berman, et al., Workplace Relations: Friendship Patterns 
and Consequences (According to Managers), 62 Pub. Admin. Rev. 217, 
219 (2002) (explaining that workplaces facilitate the development of 
friendships because of “proximity . . . shared experiences,” and “mutual 
respect or need”); Patricia M. Sias & Daniel J. Cahill, From Coworkers 
to Friends: The Development of Peer Friendships in the Workplace, 
62 W. J. COMM. 273, 273–74 (1998) (commenting on the “importance of 
peer relationships” in the workplace, “which provide an individual 
instrumental and emotional support” and can have a significant impact 
on an individual’s life as coworkers become friends). 
167. See Jacob Eisenberg, Group Cohesiveness, in 1 Encyclopedia of 
Social Psychology 386, 387 (Roy F. Baumeister & Kathleen D. 
Vohs, eds., 2007) (noting that groups where “members interact more 
with each other” tend to be more cohesive); Dana-Nicoleta Lascu & 
George Zinkhan, Consumer Conformity: Review and Applications for 
Marketing Theory and Practice, J. Marketing Theory & Prac., 
Summer 1999, at 1, 5 (“[T]he amount of interaction between group 
members may affect the level of conformity.”); cf. Treviño et al., supra 
note 93, at 966 (noting that the “frequency and intensity of interaction 
of peers” in the workplace strengthens their influence on an individual’s 
ethical behavior). 
168. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 5, at 1018 (stating that peers likely have a 
stronger impact in more “formally organized practices, such as health 
maintenance organizations (HMOs),” and more “formally organized 
hospitals” such as teaching hospitals). 
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is an early adopter of the procedure.169 Studies looking at physician 
prescribing practices likewise show the influence of other physicians 
within the immediate work environment: the likelihood of a physician 
prescribing a new drug increases as a physician’s workplace colleagues 
increasingly prescribe the drug.170  
B. Physicians’ Organizational Identification with HCOs 
As noted in Part III.A, individuals have a powerful need for 
meaningful social relationships. According to social identity theory, 
this leads individuals to not only desire others’ approval but also to 
identify with a group or organization to which they belong.171 This 
psychological identification with the organization can cause an 
individual to feel loyalty to and investment in the organization, 
“induc[ing] individuals to take the group’s perspective and to 
experience the group’s goals and interests as their own.”172 In 
addition, this identification with the organization frequently leads 
individuals to internalize the group’s values, norms, attitudes, and 
behavior.173 Having internalized the group’s standards and beliefs, 
 
169. Jose J. Escarce, Externalities in Hospitals and Physician Adoption of a 
New Surgical Technology: An Exploratory Analysis, 15 J. Health 
Econ. 715, 729 (1996). 
170. See Shu-Jou Lin et al., Colleague Interactions and New Drug 
Prescribing Behavior: The Case of the Initial Prescription of 
Antidepressants in Taiwanese Medical Centers, 73 Soc. Sci. & Med. 
1208 (2011) (confirming the findings of prior studies, namely that the 
likelihood of a physician adopting a new drug is influenced by the 
adoption ratio for the drug among the physician’s colleagues).  
171. See Blake E. Ashforth & Fred Mael, Social Identity Theory and the 
Organization, 14 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 20, 21 (1989) (“According to 
[social identity theory], the self-concept is comprised of a personal 
identity encompassing idiosyncratic characteristics (e.g., bodily 
attributes, abilities, psychological traits, interests) and a social identity 
encompassing salient group classifications. Social identification . . . is 
the perception of oneness with or belongingness to some human 
aggregate.”); Michael A. Hogg et al., A Tale of Two Theories: A 
Critical Comparison of Identity Theory with Social Identity Theory, 58 
Soc. Psychol. Q. 255, 259 (1995) (“The basic idea [of social identity 
theory] is that a social category (e.g., nationality, political affiliation, 
sports team) into which one falls, and to which one feels one belongs, 
provides a definition of who one is in terms of the defining 
characteristics of the category—a self-definition that is a part of the self-
concept.”).  
172. Daan van Knippenberg, Work Motivation and Performance: A Social 
Identity Perspective, 49 Applied Psychol. 357, 360 (2000).  
173. See Ashforth & Mael, supra note 171, at 26 (“[Group identification] may 
engender internalization of, and adherence to, group values and norms 
and homogeneity in attitudes and behavior.”); Michael Riketta, 
Organizational Identification: A Meta-Analysis, 66 J. Vocational 
Behav. 358, 361 (2005) (explaining that each member of an 
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individuals experience enhanced self-respect when they conform to 
group expectations and feel guilt and shame when they fail to do so.174  
As physicians move from solo and small group practices to HCOs, 
we might anticipate that they similarly will internalize the values, 
norms, and goals of their respective HCOs into their cognitive 
schemas. Whether they in fact do so, however, depends on both the 
intensity of a physician’s identification with an HCO and whether she 
identifies more strongly with the HCO or the medical profession 
generally.  
Membership in an organization does not automatically translate 
into a commitment to and internalization of the organization’s goals, 
norms, and values. Rather, those individuals who identify strongly 
with a group are more receptive to the influence of others in the 
group and show greater adherence to group norms than those with a 
weaker sense of group identification.175 Moreover, when individuals 
 
organization “link[s] his or her organizational membership to his or her 
self-concept [in several ways, including by] . . . internalizing 
organizational values”).  
174. See Simon Taggar & Heather MacDonald, Social Norms and 
Conformity, in Encyclopedia of Industrial and Organizational 
Psychology, supra note 163, at 738, 739 (explaining that individuals 
who “have truly and wholly accepted the beliefs, values and attitudes” 
of the group conform “because the norm is seen as right,” and not 
because of external forces such as rewards or punishments). 
175. See David R. Hekman et al., Effects of Organizational and Professional 
Identification on the Relationship Between Administrators’ Social 
Influence and Professional Employees’ Adoption of New Work Behavior, 
94 J. Applied Psychol. 1325, 1325–26 (2009) (stating that research 
has found that “a person’s identification with a group increases the 
person’s receptivity to social influence from other group members and 
decreases the person’s receptivity to social influence from non-group 
members,” and that “organizational identification increases members’ 
adherence to group norms”). For example, a study of professional 
employees found that those who identified strongly with their 
organization were more receptive to the influence of administrators 
seeking changes in employee behavior. In contrast, those that identified 
weakly with the organization were less receptive to administrators’ 
influence. See id. (summarizing the results of a study on the impact of 
organizational identification and professional identification). In the 
health care context, studies looking at physician groups found that 
practice culture had a larger effect on physician decision making in 
those physician groups where physicians reported a stronger sense of 
belonging. See Rebecca Shackelton et al., Does the Culture of a Medical 
Practice Affect the Clinical Management of Diabetes by Primary Care 
Providers?, 14 J. Health Servs. Res. & Pol’y 96, 100 (2009) 
(reporting the findings of study on practice culture and physician 
decision making for diabetes); see also Lisa Marceau et al., The Relative 
Contribution of Patient, Provider, and Organizational Influences to the 
Appropriate Diagnosis and Management of Diabetes Mellitus, 
17 J. Evaluation Clinical Prac. 1122, 1126 (2011) (reporting the 
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belong to multiple groups, the cognitive schemas associated with the 
group that the individual identifies most strongly with tend to be 
more salient than the schemas associated with other groups.176 
Physicians who identify strongly with their respective HCOs and less 
so with the medical profession are therefore more likely to apply 
cognitive schemas that reflect their respective HCOs’ values, norms, 
and goals; in contrast, those with more tenuous connections to their 
respective HCOs or stronger professional identifications are less likely 
to do so.177  
While the degree to which physicians identify with an HCO likely 
varies widely, several recent trends may promote stronger ties 
between HCOs and their affiliated physicians. First, research suggests 
that the growing interdependence between physicians and HCOs will 
strengthen physicians’ organizational identification.178 As described in 
 
findings of a second similar study). Similarly, another study found that 
physicians who identified more strongly with their health care system 
were more likely to engage in cooperative behaviors and organizational 
citizenship. See Janet M. Dukerich et al., Beauty is in the Eye of the 
Beholder: The Impact of Organizational Identification, Identity, and 
Image on the Cooperative Behaviors of Physicians, 47 Admin. Sci. Q. 
507, 521 (2002) (reporting the results of a study on organizational 
identification).  
176. See Hogg, supra note 171, at 258 (explaining that “the more strongly 
committed an individual is to [a group] identity . . . the higher the level 
of identity salience” in comparison with other identities); Sheldon 
Stryker & Peter J. Burke, The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity 
Theory, 63 Soc. Psych. Q. 284, 289 (2000) (“If the competing or 
conflicting identifies reflect greatly different commitments and 
consequently differ greatly in salience, the identity based on greater 
commitment and higher salience will be reflected . . . in the operative 
identity standard and perceived self-meanings.”). 
177. Cf. Hekman et al., supra note 175, at 1329–30 (finding that 
administrators’ social influences were greater for those professional 
employees, including physicians, with high levels of organizational 
identification and low levels of professional identification and lowest for 
professional employees with low levels of organizational identification 
and high levels of professional identification).  
178. See Jeffrey A. Alexander et al., The Ties That Bind: Interorganizational 
Linkages and Physician-System Alignment, 39 Med. Care I-30, I-40 
(Supp. I 2001) [hereinafter Alexander et al., The Ties That Bind] 
(finding that physicians who had stronger operational linkages with a 
health system had stronger loyalty to the system and more citizenship 
behaviors); Jeffrey A. Alexander et al., Risk Assumption and Physician 
Alignment with Health Care Organizations, 39 Med. Care I-46 
(Supp. I 2001) [hereinafter Alexander et al., Risk Assumption] (finding 
that physicians with a higher proportion of their revenue from managed 
care exhibited higher levels of alignment with their health systems while 
those physicians bearing financial risk at the individual level had weaker 
alignment with their health systems, presumably because shared risk at 
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Part I, physicians increasingly rely on HCOs to provide the capital, 
technology, and staff needed to meet the burdens of practicing 
medicine.179 HCOs also can help physicians achieve the quality 
improvements and efficiencies demanded by recent payment 
reforms.180 In addition, changes in health care reimbursement that 
impose financial risk at the organizational level tie a physician’s 
individual finances to the HCO’s success. This in turn fosters a sense 
of “shared fate” among the HCO’s physicians and the HCO.181 Finally, 
several studies have found that the rising trend of salaried 
employment among HCO physicians also strengthens physicians’ 
interdependence, and thus identification, with their respective 
HCOs.182 
Second, today’s HCOs are emphasizing greater clinical 
integration. Health experts consider clinical integration a prerequisite 
to success under the new payment models that hold providers 
accountable for the quality and cost of care.183 By definition, clinical 
integration requires frequent collaborations among an HCO’s 
providers.184 In addition, physicians in clinically integrated HCOs are 
likely to have invested considerable time and energy into improving 
the quality, efficiency, and coordination of patient care provided by 
the HCO, such as by helping to develop clinical protocols and “best 
practices.”185 Greater clinical integration thus promotes stronger 
organizational identification among an HCO’s physicians.  
 
the organizational level and managed care increase the interdependence 
between health systems and their affiliated physicians). 
179. See supra notes 39–60 and accompanying text. 
180. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
181. See Alexander et al., Risk Assumption, supra note 178, at I-56.  
182. See Burns & Muller, supra note 31, at 401 (stating that studies of 
physicians’ hospital employment found that salaries, along with 
stipends, “raised most measures of hospital loyalty, commitment, 
retention, trust in the hospital administration, and citizenship 
behavior”); Lawton R. Burns et al., Physician Commitment to 
Organized Delivery Systems, 39 Med. Care I-9, I-9 to I-10 (Supp. I 
2001) (reporting the results of a study finding that physicians who 
received a salary or stipend had higher levels of organizational 
commitment relative to other physicians, although noting that the 
differences were not large); Dukerich et al., supra note 175, at 520–21 
(finding that salaried physicians within large health care systems 
indicated stronger organizational identification and thus a greater 
willingness to engage in organizational citizenship behaviors). 
183. See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
184. See supra note 21 (defining clinical integration). 
185. Cf. Alexander et al., The Ties That Bind, supra note 178, at I-40 
(stating that physicians with sizeable managed care practices have 
stronger identification with their health system, in part, because they 
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Finally, today’s HCOs often shy away from the centralized, 
bureaucratic controls that characterized many earlier HCOs. Because 
physicians highly value their professional autonomy, many physicians 
respond negatively to administrative and other formal controls.186 In 
fact, the centralized control that characterized early HCOs actually 
resulted in decreased organizational identification among HCO 
physicians.187 Having learned from the failures of past HCOs, today’s 
HCOs are more respectful of physicians’ desires for professional 
autonomy. Rather than imposing bureaucratic controls on physicians 
that require them to adopt certain practices, many of today’s HCOs 
promote physician engagement through collaboration and consensus 
building.188 For example, today’s HCOs frequently place physicians in 
key leadership positions and employ a collaborative decision-making 
process when making strategic or operational decisions.189  
Only time will tell whether physicians affiliated with HCOs come 
to strongly identify with the organization. Nevertheless, there are 
reasons to believe that physicians will in fact do so, gradually 
incorporating into their cognitive schemas the norms, values, and 
goals of their respective HCOs.  
 
are “likely to have invested considerable time, money and energy into 
improving or streamlining their interactions with the system”). 
186. See id. at I-31 (stating that “physicians may react negatively to formal 
governance and administrative ties that potentially inhibit their 
professional autonomy” and that “violations of these cultural norms may 
actually decrease physicians’ feelings of identity and alignment with 
[health systems]”). 
187. See id. at I-40 (finding that centralized control by a health system over 
group management and strategic decisions lowered physicians’ 
organizational citizenship and behavioral commitment).  
188. See, e.g., Kreindler et al., supra note 34, at 470–76 (profiling Tucson 
Medical Center’s ACO, where participants emphasized physician 
engagement through intensive relationship building and collaboration 
rather than control, and Norton Healthcare, which focused on building 
consensus and team collaboration). 
189. See Harbeck, supra note 17, at 50 (“Governance models should include 
employed physicians on boards, in executive leadership roles, and on 
committees focused on improving quality and reducing costs.”); Edward 
A. Kazemek, Physician Collaboration: Is Money the Only Answer?, 
Healthcare Exec., July–Aug. 2006, at 54, 54–55 (noting that 
hospitals that have successfully formed hospital-physician collaborations 
involved physicians in decisions that affect them and created meaningful 
leadership roles for physicians); Kathleen D. Sanford, Shared 
Governance: One Way to Engage Employed Physicians, Healthcare 
Fin. Mgmt., Sept. 2012, at 44, 44 (noting that healthcare systems 
such as hospitals “are restructuring their management teams to 
include more physicians”). 
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C. The Impact of an Organization on a Physician’s Self-Interest and 
Cognitive Processes 
Classical economic models of individual decision making have long 
emphasized the importance of self-interest, conceiving of individuals 
as rational, goal-driven decision makers who seek to maximize their 
own welfare.190 While the work of cognitive psychologists challenges 
economists’ conceptualization of individuals as purposeful, rational 
actors, psychological research nevertheless confirms that self-interest 
is indeed an important influence on an individual’s decision-making 
process.191 Research on cognitive thinking has found that we are 
biased to “see what [we] want to see,” and what we want to see is 
that the “fair” or “logical” decision is one that also promotes our self-
interest.192 Accordingly, HCOs further influence their affiliated 
physicians’ clinical decisions by shaping their self-interests.  
1.  Cognitive Motivation, Self-Interest, and the Organization 
While many factors shape cognitive thought, the individual’s self-
interest—her wishes, desires, and preferences—plays a key role. When 
people have a vested interest in the outcome of their thinking and 
reasoning, they have an unconscious tendency to form initial 
judgments that suit their desired ends or goals.193 Because these 
 
190. See Robert Cooter & Melvin A. Eisenberg, Fairness, Character, and 
Efficiency in Firms, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1717, 1724 (2001) (explaining 
that economic theory rests on the premise that people are motivated by 
“a narrow self that is interested only in wealth, power, pleasure, and 
prestige”); Thomas L. Greaney, Economic Regulation of Physicians: A 
Behavioral Economics Perspective, 53 St. Louis U. L.J. 1189, 1194 
(2009) (explaining that “[o]ne of the pivotal underlying assumptions of 
economics is Rational Choice Theory,” which assumes that actors “seek 
to maximize their expected utility”). While earlier theories defined self-
interest narrowly as centering on pecuniary rewards, contemporary 
economists have expanded the concept to include anything of value to 
an individual, including gaining others’ approval and upholding one’s 
moral values. See Cooter & Eisenberg, supra at 1723–24 (distinguishing 
narrow self-interest from broad self-interest); Russell Cropanzano et al., 
Self-Interest: Defining and Understanding a Human Motive, 
26 J. Organizational Behav. 985, 986 (2005) (explaining that while 
classical economics defined self-interest as a concern with pecuniary 
payoffs, many contemporary economists would not limit human motives 
to such a narrow definition of self-interest). 
191. See infra Part III.C.1. 
192. See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of 
Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social 
Harms), 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101, 144 (1997) (stating that, when there is 
enough ambiguity to permit it, people see what is in their self-interest). 
193. See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court 2010 Term: Foreword: Neutral 
Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional 
Law, 125 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 19 (2011) (describing “the unconscious 
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automatic impressions are “first on the scene,” they play a dominant 
part in individuals’ subsequent thinking.194 More conscious, systematic 
deliberations generally perform a secondary role, serving to rationalize 
or justify individuals’ initial judgments.195 In other words, the 
motivation to arrive at a conclusion consistent with one’s self-interest 
enhances the use of cognitive schemas—memories, beliefs, and rules—
likely to produce the desired conclusion.196 Psychologists refer to this 
dynamic as cognitive motivation.197 
Organizations motivate individuals’ cognitions by shaping their 
self-interests in numerous ways. Most obviously, organizations provide 
 
tendency of individuals to process information in a manner that suits 
some end or goal”). For example, studies have found that individuals 
have faster reaction times when generating and endorsing memories and 
beliefs consistent with conclusions that promote an individual’s self-
interest or desired ends. See Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated 
Reasoning, 108 Psychol. Bull. 480, 484 (1990) (summarizing studies 
on biased-memory search). 
194. See Don A. Moore & George Loewenstein, Self-Interest, Automaticity, 
and the Psychology of Conflict of Interest, 17 Soc. Just. Res. 189, 193 
(2004) (“Automatic processes tend to dominate, in part because they 
tend to be ‘first on the scene,’ with controlled processes acting as an 
override.”); Regan, supra note 145, at 954 (“[Intuitions] represent an 
immediate judgment about a situation . . . .”). 
195. See Kahneman, supra note 90, at 105 (explaining that deliberative 
processes merely endorse individuals’ initial impressions by providing 
justifications for them); Regan, supra note 145, at 959–60 (“[W]e 
typically engage in moral reasoning after our judgments have been 
formed, and . . . we engage in that exercise in order to justify, rather 
than arrive at, those judgments.”). This does not mean deliberative 
reasoning cannot override our initial impressions—it can—but doing so 
requires mobilizing substantial mental focus, something individuals do 
infrequently, particularly when their mental capacity is otherwise taxed 
by the complexity of the situation or performing other tasks. 
See Kahneman, supra note 90, at 81 (describing the “laziness” of 
System 2 deliberative cognitive processes); Moore & Loewenstein, supra 
note 194, at 193 (stating that although “[c]ontrolled processes can 
override automatic processes,” studies have found “that when mental 
capacity is constrained because people are under cognitive load, it is 
harder for them to engage in reflection and correction of automatic 
judgments”). 
196. See Kunda, supra note 193, at 480 (“[T]he motivation to arrive at 
particular conclusions enhances use of those [cognitive schemas] that are 
considered most likely to yield the desired conclusion.”). 
197. See William M. P. Klein & Matthew M. Monin, Motivated Cognition, in 
2 Encyclopedia of Social Psychology, supra note 168, at 593, 593 
(“Motivated cognition refers to the influence of motives on various types 
of thought processes such as memory, information processing, reasoning, 
judgment, and decision making.”); Kahan, supra note 193, at 19 
(“What’s meant when an extrinsic goal is said to motivate cognition is 
that it directs mental operations . . . .”). 
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monetary and nonmonetary rewards to their employees, including 
wages, bonuses, promotions, and prestige.198 Not surprisingly, much 
research shows that these rewards serve as powerful motivators, with 
individuals inclined toward those actions that offer the greatest profit, 
opportunities for advancement, or prestige.199  
Organizations, however, also provide employees important social 
rewards. As discussed in Parts III.A and III.B, individuals have a 
fundamental need to form meaningful social relationships, which in 
turn leads them to desire the approval of others within the 
organization.200 Relatedly, an individual often develops an 
identification with an organization, which leads to feelings of loyalty 
to the organization and the internalization of the organization’s values 
and norms.201 An individual’s self-interest therefore includes not only 
the monetary and nonmonetary rewards an organization offers to its 
members but also the social rewards of organizational membership 
and the interests of the organization itself. When an individual makes 
decisions in the organizational setting, these various organizational 
rewards and interests motivate the individual’s cognitive reasoning.202 
First, the individual generates intuitive judgments or heuristics 
consistent with their desire to obtain organizational rewards or 
promote the organization’s interests or values.203 Second, the 
individual is biased to process and analyze information in a manner 
that rationalizes positions congenial to her self-interest as shaped by 
the organization.204  
 
198. See James, supra note 156, at 46–48 (describing organizational reward 
systems). 
199. See Cropanzano et al., supra note 191, at 986 (“Research suggests that 
individual profit can be a powerful motivator and, other things being 
equal, the greater the potential profit (loss) the stronger its motivational 
properties.”); supra notes 155–56 and accompanying text. 
200. See supra notes 158–59 and accompanying text. 
201. See supra notes 172–73 and accompanying text. 
202. Cf. Kahan, supra note 193, at 20–21 (stating that the desire to affirm 
one’s membership in a group can reflect a range of goals and needs). 
203. See id. at 21 (stating that cognitive processes protective of group 
identity “might take the form of rapid, heuristic-driven, even visceral 
judgments or perceptions”). For a more general discussion of so-called 
defense-motivated heuristics, see Serena Chen et al., Motivated Heuristic 
and Systematic Processing, 10 Psychol. Inquiry 44, 45 (1999) 
(explaining that the desire to form judgments congruent with one’s self-
interest leads to selective use of heuristics, with “[h]euristics that have 
judgmental implications congenial to perceivers’ existing 
beliefs . . . especially likely to be used”).  
204. See Kahan, supra note 193, at 21 (“[F]ar from being immune from 
identity-protective cognition, individuals who display a greater 
disposition to use reflective and deliberative (so-called System 2) forms 
of reasoning . . . can be expected to be even more adept at using 
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2.  HCO Physicians’ Motivated Cognition  
The theory of motivated cognition predicts that a physician’s self-
interest, as shaped by her HCO, significantly influences her patient-
care decisions. That is, the motivation to reach a clinical conclusion 
that promotes the physician’s self-interest may trigger cognitive 
schemas that lead to the desired conclusion. A physician’s self-interest 
thus affects how she perceives a patient’s situation, her generation 
and testing of clinical hypotheses, and the attitudes and values she 
applies, particularly in situations of ambiguity. This Part presents 
various illustrations of this dynamic.  
Cognitive motivation theory indicates that physicians’ self-
interests may affect their initial perceptions and intuitions about a 
patient’s situation. For instance, if an HCO provides bonuses to 
physicians who reduce the rate of hospital admissions among their 
patients, physicians benefit financially when they conclude that a 
patient’s condition does not warrant inpatient care. Cognitively 
motivated to reach this conclusion, a physician may unconsciously 
form initial perceptions and hypotheses about the patient’s condition 
that support treating the patient outside the hospital setting. 
Motivated cognition similarly may affect a physician’s subsequent 
testing of her initial hypothesis about a patient’s condition. 
Substantial evidence demonstrates that individuals’ deliberative 
cognitive processes are subject to a confirmation bias. In other words, 
the schemas accessed by individuals bias them to seek evidence 
confirming their initial hypotheses and may even blind them to 
contrary evidence.205 Studies confirm that physicians are not immune 
to the confirmation bias and that they frequently focus their efforts 
on finding clinical evidence confirming their hypotheses rather than 
seeking disconfirming evidence.206 The theory of cognitive motivation 
 
technical information and complex analysis to bolster group-congenial 
beliefs.”). For a more general discussion of how self-interest 
subconsciously biases individuals’ cognitive processing on information, 
see Chen et al., supra note 203, at 45 (explaining that the desire to form 
judgments congruent with one’s self-interest leads to biased scrutiny, 
with “[i]nformation that is congruent with one’s existing 
beliefs . . . judged more favorably than incongruent information”).  
205. See Harris, supra note 94, at 311 (explaining that the confirmation bias 
can “blind individuals to features of the world that threaten the validity 
of those schemas” supporting their hypothesis). 
206. See Pat Croskerry, Achieving Quality in Clinical Decision Making: 
Cognitive Strategies and Detection of Bias, 9 Acad. Emerg. Med. 
1184, 1189 (2002) (contending that a confirmation bias may lead 
physicians “to look for confirming evidence to support the hypothesis, 
rather than look for disconfirming evidence to refute it”); Hall, supra 
note 69, at 221 (“Doctors search harder for evidence that confirms a 
decision than disconfirmatory information . . . .”). 
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suggests that physicians’ confirmation biases may be particularly 
strong when confirming a hypothesis that promotes their self-
interests.  
Relatedly, motivated cognition may influence the extent to which 
a physician seeks evidence confirming a preliminary diagnosis. Rather 
than fully verifying a preliminary diagnosis, physicians at times 
prematurely accept a diagnosis on the basis of limited confirmatory 
evidence.207 The theory of cognitive motivation predicts that this 
“search satisficing” bias is heightened when a physician benefits from 
quickly reaching a diagnosis, such as when the HCO rewards the 
physician for limiting the number of diagnostics tests she orders.  
Motivated cognition also may distort physicians’ treatment of 
clinical observations that do not perfectly match their hypothesized 
diagnoses, a common occurrence in medicine. When an individual 
confronts information that conflicts with his or her desired conclusion, 
the confirmation bias may cause the individual to either dismiss such 
information as an aberration or recast it so as to be consistent with 
the individual’s schema.208 In the medical context, the desire to 
confirm a diagnosis has been found to cause physicians to 
overemphasize confirmatory data as compared to disconfirmatory 
data, to not explore discrepancies between the data and their 
hypotheses, or to find grounds for either rejecting discrepancies or 
concluding that they are not in fact disconfirmatory evidence.209 In 
other words, physicians subconsciously motivated to confirm a 
particular diagnosis may be biased to treat aberrations as simply 
atypical features rather than as evidence that requires consideration 
of alternative hypotheses. 
Similarly, motivated cognition may affect physicians’ evaluations 
of clinical studies and other scientific evidence. When individuals have 
a personal interest in a specific conclusion, they generally give more 
weight to supporting evidence and question the validity of 
disconfirming evidence.210 For example, studies of biased evaluation of 
 
207. See Croskerry, supra note 206, at 1195 (describing the effects of the 
premature-closure bias and search-satisficing bias on clinical decision 
making).  
208. See Harris, supra note 94, at 311 (explaining how schemas influence the 
processing of disconfirming information); Moore & Loewenstein, supra note 
195, at 193 (“Research on confirmatory information processing shows that 
people assimilate new information through the perceptual lens of their 
existing beliefs, in many cases bending facts to fit beliefs rather than vice 
versa.”); Kahneman, supra note 90, at 85–88 (describing how the 
confirmation bias impacts perceptions and thought processes). 
209. See Hall, supra note 69, at 221 (explaining the ways in which physicians 
address, or fail to address, disconfirmatory data). 
210. See Kahneman, supra note 90, at 103 (discussing the effect of bias on 
individuals’ evaluations of relevant information); Moore & Loewenstein, 
supra note 195, at 193 (“[I]nformation inconsistent with automatic 
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scientific research found that individuals generally trust evidence that 
supports their desired conclusion and disbelieve contrary evidence.211 
Of particular interest, when evaluating scientific research, individuals 
maintain the illusion of objectivity by accessing beliefs and inferential 
rules, or cognitive schemas, that support their defenses of the 
favorable scientific research and their criticisms of the disconfirming 
studies.212  
These findings suggest that physicians may view clinical studies 
through biased lenses. For example, if an HCO rewards its physicians 
for lowering costs, physicians financially benefit when they prescribe 
less expensive therapies over their more costly alternatives. To justify 
doing so, physicians may give more weight to studies finding little or 
no difference between the less and more costly therapies or may be 
dismissive of clinical studies finding that the costly therapy is more 
effective.  
Motivated cognition also may influence which subset of beliefs, 
assumptions, and values guide physicians’ clinical choices, particularly 
in conditions of uncertainty.213 Studies have found that self-interest 
triggers cognitive schemas that incorporate those beliefs that lead to 
decisions consistent with the individual’s self-interest.214 Individuals 
also find more convincing those arguments supporting their desired 
conclusion as compared to countervailing arguments.215  
These cognitive biases may lead physicians to rely on scientific 
assumptions or heuristics that support their desired clinical decisions. 
 
judgments tends to be subject to an additional level of scrutiny and is 
therefore less likely to be accepted as true.”). 
211. See Kunda, supra note 193, at 489–90 (describing the results of studies 
on the biased evaluation of scientific research). 
212. For example, individuals dismissed the disconfirmatory research for 
reasons such as insufficient sample size, nonrandom sample selection, or 
the absence of control groups. In contrast, individuals were less critical 
of the research methods employed in studies confirming their initial 
beliefs. See id.; see also Klein & Monin, supra note 198, at 594 
(“[People] are relatively more likely to trust small samples of 
information consistent with desired expectations (even when they know 
that small samples can be unreliable) and are more critical of messages 
threatening desired beliefs.”). 
213. See Kunda, supra note 194, at 483 (concluding that research suggests 
that people access different beliefs under the influence of different goals). 
214. See id. at 484, 493–94 (proposing that individuals do not access all 
relevant knowledge when biased; instead their motivations make certain 
beliefs more salient).  
215. See Jason Dana & George Loewenstein, A Social Science Perspective on 
Gifts to Physicians from Industry, 290 JAMA 252, 253 (2003) (stating 
that results from studies “showed a strong tendency to view arguments 
supporting an individual’s own position as more convincing than those 
supporting the other position”). 
Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 64·Issue 2·2013 
The Myth of the Independent Physician 
504 
For example, when an HCO rewards a physician based on 
productivity, the physician benefits from adopting an aggressive 
approach to patient management. Cognitively motivated to treat 
patients’ conditions aggressively, the physician may invoke heuristics 
that support doing so—for example, “If there is any chance of 
alleviating the patient’s condition or extending her life, the procedure 
should be performed.” Likewise, the physician may find compelling 
those scientific assumptions favoring aggressive treatment, such as the 
belief that the patient’s condition will worsen over time.  
Finally, motivated cognition may influence how physicians weigh 
others’ clinical opinions. Research has found that the motivation to 
affirm one’s commitment to an organization affects an individual’s 
cognitive reasoning.216 For example, individuals impute greater 
knowledge and trustworthiness to their organizational peers and thus 
give more credence to their views and behaviors as compared to those 
of extraorganizational individuals.217 Accordingly, the theory of 
cognitive motivation suggests that physicians who identify strongly 
with their HCO will find the views of their organizational peers more 
persuasive than contrary opinions.218 For example, if a physician’s 
organizational peers believe newer drugs are generally superior to 
older drugs, the physician will be motivated to agree with this 
viewpoint.  
In sum, physicians’ clinical judgments may be subconsciously 
biased by their self-interests, as shaped by their respective HCOs’ 
organizational cultures. This is not to imply that physicians’ clinical 
decisions always reflect their self-interests. Because physicians 
attempt to be rational and follow their professional ethics, their 
capacity for making self-serving clinical decisions is constrained by the 
 
216. See Klein & Monin, supra note 198, at 594 (“The motive to belong, 
exemplified by people’s interest in relationships and group memberships, 
might also influence various types of cognitive processes . . . .”); 
Baumeister & Leary, supra note 158, at 504 (“Group 
memberships . . . appear to exert important influences on cognitive 
patterns.”); Kahan, supra note 193, at 20 (explaining that affirming 
one’s membership in an important reference group can unconsciously 
influence cognition, generating a species of motivated reasoning known 
as identity-protective cognition). 
217. See Hekman et al., supra note 176, at 1326 (“Social identification [with 
a group] leads one to see non-group members as less trustworthy, to 
evaluate them less positively, and to view them as dissimilar.”); Kahan, 
supra note 193, at 20 (discussing ways in which group identity biases 
cognitive reasoning). 
218. Cf. Judith D. de Jong et al., Mutual Influences of General Practitioners 
in Partnerships, 57 Soc. Sci. & Med. 1515, 1516 (2003) (stating that 
physicians working in group partnerships that have developed strategies 
for dealing with clinical uncertainty are often skeptical “towards 
scientific evidence and more sensitive to peer influences”). 
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plausibility of the justifications for such decisions.219 For this reason, 
when the clinical evidence and standards of care are unambiguous, 
physicians’ medical decisions are consistent with the evidence and 
prevailing standards of care.220 But when faced with clinical 
ambiguity, physicians who genuinely desire to remain objective and 
committed to their patients’ welfare may unwittingly use self-serving 
cognitive schemas.221 Moreover, because an HCO’s organizational 
culture shapes the self-interest of its affiliated physicians, the HCO 
indirectly influences those physicians’ clinical decisions.  
As this Part has shown, a physician embedded in an HCO 
gradually adapts to the HCO’s “way of doing things.” Being part of 
an HCO thus fundamentally influences physicians’ patient-care 
decisions, particularly in conditions of uncertainty. Because this 
process largely occurs outside a physician’s conscious awareness, many 
scholars, policymakers, and even health professionals fail to appreciate 
the significance of an HCO’s organizational culture. Instead they focus 
their attention on the individual physician. Conceptualizing patient 
care as provided at the level of the individual physician, however, is a 
serious mistake because it fails to recognize the link between an 
HCO’s organizational culture and its affiliated physicians’ clinical 
decisions. With more and more physicians shifting from solo and small 
group practice to HCOs, it is imperative that we abandon the myth of 
the independent physician and recognize that patient care increasingly 
is a product of an organizational system. 
IV. The Importance of HCO Organizational Culture: 
Implications for Health Law, Policy, and Ethics 
Part III showed that there is a compelling theoretical basis for 
concluding that the culture of HCOs greatly influences the treatment 
 
219. See Kunda, supra note 193, at 480, 483 (explaining that because 
“people . . . attempt to be rational and to construct a justification of 
their desired conclusion that would persuade a dispassionate observer,” 
individuals’ abilities to arrive at the desired conclusions “is constrained 
by their ability to construct seemingly reasonable justifications for these 
conclusions”).  
220. See John E. Wennberg, Dealing with Medical Practice Variations: A 
Proposal for Action, 3 Health Aff. 6, 9 (1984) (explaining that there 
is less variation among physicians’ clinical decisions when there exists 
widespread consensus as to the proper course of treatment because 
“clinical judgments are constrained by a consensus”). 
221. See Dana & Loewenstein, supra note 215, at 253 (“[I]ndividuals are 
unable to remain objective, even when they are motivated to be 
impartial, demonstrating that self-serving bias is unintentional.”); 
Kahan, supra note 193, at 20 (motivated cognition causes a person “who 
genuinely desires to make a fair or accurate judgment” to unwittingly 
“make a determination that favors some personal interest”). 
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decisions of their affiliated physicians. Yet many health laws, policies, 
and ethical guidelines focus on the individual physician, seeking to 
minimize individual physician’s financial conflicts or holding 
individual physicians accountable for inferior care.222 A model of 
physician behavior that incorporates the impact of organizational 
culture, however, reveals the inadequacies of focusing narrowly on 
individual physicians.223 Those involved in health law, policy, and 
ethics must therefore give greater attention to the organization. 
Because HCOs are heterogeneous organizations, differences in 
their organizational cultures may lead to differences in physician 
behavior and, ultimately, differences in the quality, modality, and cost 
of care provided to patients.224 Of particular concern are 
organizational cultures that bias physicians’ clinical decision making 
in ways that lead to the provision of inexpert or inefficient care or the 
withholding of necessary care. The challenge for health scholars and 
policymakers, then, is to determine how best to promote more 
virtuous organizational cultures that minimize these risks while 
respecting community standards of compassion and fairness. This 
Part seeks to begin the conversation on this important issue. 
A. HCOs’ Organizational Ethics 
As discussed in Part I, primary responsibility for patient care 
traditionally fell to individual physicians. Organizations such as 
hospitals were relegated to the secondary role of supporting 
physicians’ treatment of their patients. Ethical issues related to 
patient care thus were matters for the medical profession and not 
organizations.225 As a result, medical ethics came to reflect the guiding 
 
222. See supra note 11; infra note 272 and accompanying text.  
223. See Flood & Fennell, supra note 12, at 163 (stating that health care 
models need to be expanded to fit the complexities of the health care 
system, including the noneconomic factors involved, “so that we can 
understand the inadequacies of financial-based policies”). 
224. Cf. Town et al., supra note 73, at 89S (“Physicians practice in 
heterogeneous organizations, which offer differing financial and 
nonfinancial incentives that may differentially impact physician 
behavior.”).  
225. See Susan M. Wolf, Health Care Reform and the Future of Physician 
Ethics, 24 Hastings Ctr. Rep. 28, 29 (1994) (stating that in the past 
the focus of ethics was on the individual physician). At the time, 
organizational ethics was limited to business and corporate matters, such 
as purchasing decisions and policies related to care for the poor. See 
Gerard Magill & Lawrence Prybil, Stewardship and Integrity in Health 
Care: A Role for Organizational Ethics, 50 J. Bus. Ethics 225, 227 
(2004) (discussing the bifurcation of biomedical ethics related to patient 
care and organizational ethics related to business and corporate matters). 
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principle of the medical profession, the Hippocratic oath.226 Medical 
ethics therefore embraced a patient-centered approach that gave 
primacy to patient welfare over societal concerns, such as efficiency 
and costs.227  
When the 1980s and 1990s ushered in an era of physicians 
affiliating with HCOs, health ethics broadened beyond its earlier 
professional focus to encompass the organization.228 Nevertheless, the 
organization-based ethical principles that emerged continued the 
patient-centered focus of the medical profession’s ethics.229 
Organizational ethics thus primarily focused on case-centered issues 
arising in the care of individual patients, such as termination of 
treatment, patient autonomy, informed consent, patient 
confidentiality, and human subjects research.230  
As argued in Part III, the values, attitudes, and beliefs that guide 
physicians’ clinical decision making increasingly will reflect not only a 
physician’s personal philosophy but also the organizational culture of 
her HCO. Organizational ethics therefore should broaden its focus 
beyond case-centered, patient-care issues and address how to promote 
organizational cultures that inspire appropriate clinical decisions by 
the organization’s physicians.231 In other words, organizational ethics 
 
226. See Hall, supra note 18, at 435 (commenting that prior to the arrival of 
managed care, medical treatment was dominated by the Hippocratic ideal). 
227. See Rorty, supra note 143, at 49 (“Contemporary clinical ethics has 
focused almost exclusively on the individual patient and his personal 
autonomy, not on the larger community.”); Morreim, supra note 79, at 9–
10 (stating that the system of affluent insurance leads to “cost is no 
object” values among physicians as part of a moral commitment to 
patients). An insurance system that was highly deferential to physicians’ 
treatment decisions and reimbursed them their reasonable costs reinforced 
these principles. See generally Morreim, supra note 79, at 9–10 (stating 
that “the era of affluent insurance” promoted values that focused on 
providing patients any potentially beneficial care regardless of cost). 
228. See Carrie Zoubul, Healthcare Institutional Ethics: Broader Than 
Clinical Ethics, in Health Care Ethics: Critical Issues for the 
21st Century 237, 237 (Eileen E. Morrison ed., 2d ed. 2009) 
(noting that at the end of the twentieth century, many HCOs began 
to focus on ethical issues).  
229. See id. at 237–39 (discussing organizational ethics programs).  
230. See id. More recently, HCOs have expanded their focus to include 
compliance with legal and regulatory requirements. See David E. 
Guinn, Corporate Compliance and Integrity Programs: The Uneasy 
Alliance Between Law and Ethics, 12 HEC F. 292, 292, 295 (2000) 
(stating that “corporate compliance programs in health care have 
exploded upon the scene” and that such programs are aimed at 
“preventing, detecting, and reporting” violations of the law by the 
organization and its employees or agents). 
231. See Magill & Prybil, supra note 226, at 227 (arguing that an 
organizational ethics strategy should seek “to foster a virtuous 
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should be reconceptualized as a “more global vision of the elements of 
organizational life that affect patient care,”232 with greater attention 
given “to the mission and values of the organization and how they are 
implemented in daily practice and long-term planning.”233  
Health ethicists also should provide more guidance to HCOs on 
the content of their mission and guiding values. Although a 
comprehensive discussion of the core values of HCOs is beyond the 
scope of this Article, clearly a central mission of all HCOs is healing 
patients. As such, they are subject to the same ethical expectations 
guiding health professionals—a commitment to a patient’s best 
interests.234 However, with payment reforms imposing on HCOs 
greater responsibility for both the aggregate cost of treating and 
overall well-being of patient populations, HCOs also have a moral 
obligation to make prudent use of health care resources.235 In addition, 
because HCOs must ensure their financial solvency, efficiency 
considerations are of paramount importance to them, with for-profit 
organizations having the further commitment of maximizing 
shareholder wealth.236 Because these core values will at times come 
into conflict,237 health ethicists must assist HCOs in developing an 
ethical framework for appropriately balancing these values. 
Health ethicists similarly should provide guidance to HCOs on 
how best to develop an ethics infrastructure for ensuring that the 
HCO’s values and priorities are incorporated into the daily life of the 
 
organization whose ethical principles inspire appropriate decision-making 
and moral behavior among all its personnel”). 
232. Rorty, supra note 143, at 53 (emphasis added). 
233. Donna T. Chen & Ann E. Mills, Addressing Ethical Commitments When 
Professionals Partner with Organizations, 39 McGeorge L. Rev. 719, 
728 (2008). 
234. See Rorty, supra note 143, at 52 (“Insofar as organizations also are 
ethical agents, and instrumentalities of the society for health care, they 
are subject to many of the ethical expectations that the society has of 
individual providers . . . .”). 
235. See Magill & Prybil, supra note 225, at 228 (stating that HCOs’ 
organizational ethics must integrate stewardship virtues that respect the 
resources entrusted to it by the community). See generally Laurence B. 
McCullough, A Basic Concept in the Clinical Ethics of Managed Care: 
Physicians and Institutions as Economically Disciplined Moral Co-
Fiduciaries of Populations of Patients, 24 J. Med. & Phil. 77, 93 
(1999) (commenting on health care institutions’ moral fiduciary 
responsibilities for the well-being of their patients). 
236. See Chen & Mills, supra note 233, at 721 (“[O]ne commitment of for-
profit organizations is to maximize shareholder wealth . . . .”). 
237. See id. (noting that organizations such as hospitals face conflicting 
commitments, presenting significant ethical challenges to the 
organizations). 
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organization.238 Any such ethics program should attend to whether the 
HCO’s formal structures, policies, and processes reflect and 
appropriately balance its core values.239 For example, the HCO’s 
reward system, clinical guidelines, and treatment protocols should 
align with its espoused values.240 Similarly, the HCO’s ethics program 
should foster an organizational culture that, at the informal level, 
motivates clinical decisions consistent with its core values and 
priorities.  
Health ethicists and the medical profession also should consider 
whether the shift away from solo and small group physician practices 
to large HCOs warrants a revision of physicians’ professional ethics.241 
Physicians affiliated with HCOs occupy “two roles—one the 
responsible professional whose loyalty is to the standards of the 
profession, the other the responsible employee whose loyalty is to the 
organization.”242 At times these two roles will conflict: the first 
generally requires the physician to put an individual patient’s welfare 
above all other considerations, whereas the latter requires the 
physician to balance patient welfare with other organizational 
prerogatives, such as efficiency and cost considerations.  
Resolving this conflict between the existing tenets of physicians’ 
professional ethics and HCOs’ organizational ethics will be one of the 
most important issues confronting health ethicists and the medical 
profession. Some scholars have argued that physicians’ first 
commitment must be to their professional ethics, with physicians 
therefore obligated to put their patients’ welfare above other HCO 
prerogatives.243 One must query, however, whether in practice it is 
 
238. See Silverman, supra note 141, at 202 (calling for an ethics 
infrastructure that proactively incorporates an HCO’s core values into 
the daily life of the organization). 
239. See id. at 209 (advocating for “the continuous attention to the 
structures and processes that influence[ ] ethical behavior”). 
240. See id. at 211.  
241. Cf. Wolf, supra note 225, at 28 (stating that the conflict between 
physicians’ traditional professional ethics and managed care prerogatives 
means “some currently accepted tenets of medical ethics will have to be 
clarified, others changed, and the whole supplemented”). 
242. Toni Makkai & Valerie Braithwaite, Professionalism, Organizations, 
and Compliance, 18 Law & Soc. Inquiry 33, 36 (1993); see also 
Edmund D. Pellegrino & David C. Thomasma, The Virtues in 
Medical Practice 170–71 (1993) (stating that organized medical 
practice puts a “physician in a position of double agency—
simultaneously serving the patient, and the institutional policy”). 
243. See, e.g., Marcia Angell, The Doctor as Double Agent, 3 Kennedy 
Inst. Ethics J. 279, 284–85 (1993) (arguing that even if society desires 
to reduce health care costs, physicians should not serve as “double 
agents” because their sole obligation is to care for their patients); 
Edmund D. Pellegrino, Rationing Health Care: The Ethics of Medical 
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realistic to expect physicians to do so given the influence, often at a 
subconscious level, of their organizational peers, organizational 
identity, and self-interest. More pragmatically, physicians’ professional 
ethics should be reshaped to permit “greater sensitivity to values 
beyond those of the immediate patient seeking treatment.”244  
B. HCOs’ Internal Organizational Arrangements 
In recognition of the impact HCOs have on physicians’ clinical 
decisions, greater attention should be given to the organizational 
causes of deficient patient care, including an organization’s internal 
policies and arrangements. To the extent certain internal structures or 
arrangements are found to promote a more virtuous organizational 
culture, policymakers should consider whether to mandate that all 
HCOs adopt such structures and arrangements. Similarly, regulators 
may wish to prohibit HCOs from adopting organizational features 
associated with less-than-virtuous organizational cultures. In light of 
the limited research on this issue, it would be premature to 
recommend specific regulatory proposals related to HCOs’ internal 
arrangements. This Part instead highlights several organizational 
arrangements that may warrant closer examination—mandating that 
HCOs adopt formal organizational ethics programs, requiring that 
health professionals occupy HCO leadership positions, and prohibiting 
for-profit HCOs. 
1. Organizational Ethics Programs 
Part IV.A argued that health ethicists should give greater 
attention to organizational ethics. Ethical guidance for organizations, 
however, will not foster virtuous organizational cultures if ignored by 
HCOs. Consequently, regulators should consider whether to mandate 
that HCOs adopt formal organizational ethics programs as a condition 
of state licensure or eligibility for government health care programs.245 
 
Gatekeeping, 2 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol’y 23 (1986) (arguing 
that society must preserve the integrity of a physician’s primary 
responsibility to the patient’s interest); Herbert M. Swick, Toward a 
Normative Definition of Medical Professionalism, 75 Acad. Med. 612, 
614 (2000) (defining medical professionalism as requiring that the 
physician treat a patient’s legitimate interests and needs as paramount 
over the physician’s own interests and the demands of the health system 
employing the physician). 
244. Ruger, supra note 7, at 1519–20. 
245. For example, HCOs must meet various “conditions of participation” in 
order to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. For a 
general description of these requirements, see Conditions for Coverage 
(CfCs) & Conditions of Participations (CoPs), Ctrs. for Medicare & 
Medicaid Servs., http://www.cms.gov/Regulations-and-Guidance/Leg
islation/CFCsAndCoPs/index.html (last visited Nov. 24, 2013). 
Similarly, state agencies will only grant licenses to HCOs that meet the 
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Requiring HCOs to adopt formal organizational ethics programs 
would force “leaders and managers to face the fact that working 
through ethical conflicts and deliberating over ethical commitments 
should have an important structural presence.”246 In addition, 
regulators could require that HCOs broaden their focus beyond ethical 
issues arising in individual, patient-care settings and consider the 
larger issue of promoting a virtuous organizational culture.247 In 
particular, HCOs could be required give attention to how their formal 
structures and informal cultures impact physicians’ clinical decision 
making. 
2. Health Professionals in Leadership Positions 
While a formal organizational ethics program may be a good 
starting point for promoting a virtuous organizational culture, they 
often “are too easily displayed as window dressings that are honored 
only through lip service without any sincere efforts to inculcate their 
principles in the thinking and behavior of management and 
employees.”248 Attention, then, should be given to other internal 
factors influencing an HCO’s organizational culture, including the 
composition of the organization’s leadership. 
Experts in organizational culture have found that organizational 
leaders play a fundamental role in shaping an organization’s culture.249 
At the formal level, leaders have responsibility for articulating the 
organization’s mission, setting standards of conduct, and allocating 
organizational rewards and status.250 Leaders also communicate the 
 
standards established by the state. See Anne L. Rooney & Paul R. 
van Ostenberg, Licensure, Accreditation, and Certification: 
Approaches to Health Services Quality 3 (1999) (defining 
licensure). 
246. Chen & Mills, supra note 233, at 735. 
247. See generally id. at 730 (“[T]he role of an organization ethics program is 
to articulate and promote the healthcare organization’s mission and 
values—synthesized from its professional, clinical, and business ethics 
commitments—through its activities.”). 
248. Mark A. Hall, A Corporate Ethic of “Care” in Health Care, 3 Seattle 
J. for Soc. Just. 417, 421 (2004). 
249. See, e.g., Edgar H. Schein, Organizational Culture and 
Leadership 235–58 (4th ed. 2010) (describing the ways in which leaders 
embed and transmit culture); Amy Klemm Verbos et al., The Positive 
Ethical Organization: Enacting a Living Code of Ethics and Ethical 
Organizational Identity, 76 J. Bus. Ethics 17, 22 (2007) (“Leaders’ key 
role in influencing ethical practices in their organizations is well 
established in the business ethics literature.”). 
250. See Schein, supra note 249, at 237, 247–49, 256–57 (describing how 
leaders shape an organization’s culture—through formal statements of 
organizational philosophy, creeds, and charters—and how they allocate 
rewards and status). 
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organization’s norms and values through less formal means, such as 
by what they pay attention to, the priorities they set, and their own 
conduct.251  
Which values and norms an organizational leader chooses to 
emphasize is guided by the leader’s own cognitive frameworks, which 
in turn reflect the leader’s educational background and professional 
training.252 Given the relationship between leaders’ values and their 
backgrounds, some have suggested that physicians and other health 
professionals should occupy important leadership positions in HCOs. 
For example, several commenters on the proposed rule for the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program urged the Centers for Medicare 
and Medicaid Services (CMS) to mandate that ACOs be led by 
physician CEOs.253 Underlying this and similar proposals is the belief 
that leaders who are physicians, or other health professionals, will 
promote a more virtuous organizational culture because health 
professionals are more likely to balance business considerations with 
concerns for patient welfare.254  
 
251. See id. at 236–43, 245–47 (describing various informal ways leaders 
shape organizational culture). 
252. See John L. Campbell, Why Would Corporations Behave in Socially 
Responsible Ways? An Institutional Theory of Corporate Social 
Responsibility, 32 Acad. Mgmt. Rev. 946, 958 (2007) (explaining 
that “the cognitive frames, mindsets, conceptions of control, or world 
views of corporate managers are important determinants of how 
managers run their firms,” and that “[s]cholars emphasize that managers 
often learn [their] mental constructs by absorbing the messages that are 
transmitted to them at business schools and through the professional 
publications they pay close attention to (e.g., the business press, trade 
journals)”); cf. Eric Van den Steen, Organizational Beliefs and 
Managerial Vision, 21 J.L. Econ. & Org. 256, 258 (2005) (noting that 
studies show that a manager’s policies are correlated with whether or 
not he or she attended an MBA program). 
253. See Mark A. Warner, Public Comment on RIN 0938-AQ22: Medicare 
Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care 
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 19528-01 (proposed Apr. 7, 2011), 
Regulations.gov (June 3, 2011) (No. CMS-2010-0259), 
http://www.regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2010-0259-0801 
(final rule codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425) (submitting comments on the 
proposed rule on behalf of the American Society of Anesthesiologists and 
stating that physician leadership of ACOs is essential to ensure ACOs 
are patient centric and put patients’ interests first).  
254. See Michael Hechter, The Rise and Fall of Normative Control, 
33 Acct., Orgs. & Soc’y 663, 666 (2008) (arguing that a physician’s 
behavior will differ from a businessperson’s behavior because the norms 
of a businessperson “impels him to self-interested action (presumably, he 
is motivated to maximize his own profit),” whereas “the physician’s role 
requires him to place the welfare of his patient above his own self-
interest, financial or otherwise”); cf. Makkai & Braithwaite, supra note 
243, at 34 (arguing that individuals with a stronger professional 
orientation than business orientation are less likely to violate the law). 
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Although CMS rejected the proposal to require that ACOs be led 
by physician CEOs,255 the agency’s final rule does require that at least 
seventy-five percent control of the ACO’s governing body be held by 
representatives of the physicians, hospitals, and other health providers 
participating in the ACO.256 CMS and supporters of this governing 
requirement argued that it would “ensure that ACOs remain 
provider-driven,”257 “patient-centric,”258 and “put[ ] patients’ interests 
first.”259 If research supports the assumed link between an HCO’s 
leadership and its organizational culture, regulators should consider 
whether to impose similar governing requirements on other HCOs.  
3. Nonprofit Status 
Some commentators have suggested that nonprofit status also 
may promote a more virtuous organizational culture.260 Nonprofits 
cannot distribute earnings to owners or shareholders, but instead 
must use any surplus to support their operations and mission.261 
Consequently, the earnings of nonprofit HCOs are “a means to an 
 
Whether health professionals who occupy leadership positions are less 
business oriented and more patient focused than other health care 
leaders is a question deserving of further empirical study. 
255. See Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 
76 Fed. Reg. 67,802, 67,823 (Nov. 2, 2011) (codified at 42 C.F.R. 
pt. 425) (responding to comments and expressing the agency’s “belie[f] 
that ACOs should have flexibility to determine their leadership and 
management structure”).  
256. 42 C.F.R. § 425.106(c)(3) (2013) (setting forth requirements related to 
the composition of an ACO’s governing body); id. § 425.20 (defining the 
term “ACO participant”). 
257. Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,819. 
258. Asa C. Lockhart, Public Comment on RIN 0938-AQ22: Medicare 
Program; Medicare Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care 
Organizations, 76 Fed. Reg. 19528-01 (proposed Apr. 7, 2011), 
Regulations.gov (June 17, 2011) (No. CMS-2010-0259), http://www.
regulations.gov/#!documentDetail;D=CMS-2010-0259-0951 (final rule 
codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425) (submitting comments on the proposed 
rule on behalf of the Texas Medical Association).  
259. Id. CMS also requires that the ACO governing body include a Medicare 
beneficiary who is a patient of the ACO. 42 C.F.R. § 425.106(c)(2) 
(2013). This requirement also is intended to promote a patient centered 
culture. See Medicare Shared Savings Program, 76 Fed. Reg. at 67,826 
(explaining the rule stems from the Affordable Care Act’s requirement 
that ACOs be patient centered).  
260. See generally Hall, supra note 248, at 419–20 (arguing that nonprofit 
form may promote a culture of “caring” among HCOs). 
261. See Howard L. Oleck & Martha E. Stewart, Nonprofit 
Corporations, Organizations, and Associations 10–11 (6th ed. 
1994) (defining nonprofit organizations). 
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end”—supporting the HCO’s health care mission—“rather than an 
end in itself.”262 Although for-profits also may have goals beyond 
making money, the conventional wisdom is that these other objectives 
are secondary to their profit-making mission.263 Nonprofit HCOs are 
therefore assumed to have a deeper commitment to their mission of 
patient care than their for-profit counterparts.264  
If these assumptions are indeed correct, the organizational 
cultures of nonprofit and for-profit HCOs may differ in important 
respects. A greater commitment to their health care mission on the 
part of nonprofit HCOs may give rise to organizational cultures that 
reflect a fairer balancing of patient welfare, cost, and efficiency 
concerns.265 In contrast, the cultures of for-profit HCOs may 
overemphasize efficiency and cost saving concerns,266 leading the for-
profit HCO’s physicians to make unwarranted compromises in patient 
care.  
The objections to for-profit HCOs have proven controversial, with 
much debate over whether for-profit status actually promotes less 
virtuous organizational cultures and poorer patient outcomes.267 
Recent high-profile controversies involving for-profit health systems, 
however, raise questions about whether the fears expressed by critics 
of for-profit HCOs may be justified.268 While admittedly it would be 
 
262. Hall, supra note 248, at 419. 
263. See id. (“For-profit companies also have mission statements that seek to 
guide their corporate culture, but at least for publicly traded companies, 
we have to assume that the substantive mission is secondary to the goal 
of an increasing return on an equity investment.”). 
264. See id. (suggesting that nonprofit companies “tend to stick to their 
mission and treat it more seriously as their main purpose for existence”). 
265. See id. at 419–20 (suggesting that because nonprofit companies in 
general are more committed to their missions, nonprofit HCOs are more 
likely to have a culture of caring); Arnold S. Relman, Could Physicians 
Take the Lead in Health Reform?, 304 JAMA 2740, 2741 (2010) 
(stating that nonprofit multispecialty physician groups are “appealing 
because their professional values and their concern for the quality of 
care would outweigh commercial incentives”). 
266. See generally Arnold S. Relman, A Second Opinion: Rescuing 
America’s Health Care 36–37 (2007) (arguing that the 
entrepreneurialism inherent in investor-owned health care leads to a 
focus on the bottom line). 
267. Wolf, supra note 225, at 37 (stating that objections to for-profit status 
“are controversial, with much debate about whether the data show 
actual and negative effects on physician decisions”). See generally Jack 
Needleman, The Role of Nonprofits in Health Care, 26 J. Health Pol. 
Pol’y & L. 1113 (2001) (discussing whether tax policy should continue 
to promote nonprofit health care institutions). 
268. For example, Health Management Associates (HMA), the fourth largest 
for-profit hospital chain in the country, allegedly promoted a culture 
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imprudent to require HCOs to be nonprofit on the basis of a few 
wayward for-profit HCOs, the issue merits greater attention given the 
recent growth in HCOs.  
C. Organizational Accountability for Patient Care  
Because the clinical decisions of HCO physicians reflect the 
organizational values and norms of their HCO, patient care should be 
viewed as a product of an organizational system. Health law and 
policy therefore should impose greater accountability on HCOs for the 
cost and quality of patient care. While recent reforms in Medicare 
reimbursement policies have moved in this direction,269 others areas of 
health law and policy continue to focus on individual physicians. 
Part IV.C discusses two reforms that would shift the focus to HCOs: 
enterprise medical liability and monitoring organizational patterns of 
care. 
1. Enterprise Medical Liability 
Malpractice law traditionally focused on individual actors, holding 
physicians individually accountable when their treatment of a patient 
deviated from accepted standards of care.270 Rarely did courts hold 
organizations liable for a physician’s deficiencies. Over the past few 
decades, however, courts have expanded organizations’ liability for 
malpractice under the doctrines of vicarious liability and corporate 
negligence.271 Yet as expansive as these bases for HCO liability may 
 
that valued revenue generation at the expense of patient care. 
Specifically, the company rewarded physicians who ordered numerous 
diagnostic tests and frequently admitted patients to the hospital, 
potentially exposing patients to unnecessary risks. This reward structure 
allegedly influenced HMA physicians’ clinical decisions, such as biasing 
them to find medical conditions that would justify admitting a patient 
to the hospital. See 60 Minutes: The Cost of Admission (CBS television 
broadcast Dec. 2, 2012) (investigating the clinical practices of Health 
Management Associates). 
269. See supra notes 41–44 and accompanying text (discussing Medicare 
payment reforms). 
270. See, e.g., Adamski v. Tacoma Gen. Hosp., 579 P.2d 970, 974 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1978) (explaining that for years the majority of courts treated 
physicians as independent actors who were not subject to control by 
hospitals).  
271. Under the theory of respondeat superior, hospitals and other institutions 
are liable for the negligence of physicians who are either employees or 
agents of the hospital. In determining whether a nonemployee physician 
is an agent of the hospital or organization, some courts have moved 
away from the traditional “control” test to instead consider whether 
there is a significant relationship between the physician and the 
organization. See id. at 974–78. Under the doctrine of apparent or 
ostensible agency, courts will hold a hospital or organization vicariously 
liable for the negligent acts of a nonagent physician if the hospital holds 
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be, various doctrinal obstacles frequently bar injured patients from 
recovering from HCOs.272 Many malpractice cases therefore focus 
solely on the conduct of individual physicians, treating physicians as 
isolated actors and ignoring the impact of HCOs’ organizational 
culture on physicians’ patient-care decisions.  
In contrast to current malpractice law doctrine, the theory of 
enterprise liability shifts liability for negligence from individual actors 
to the enterprise.273 Enterprise liability in the malpractice context 
would place sole legal responsibility for deficient patient care at the 
level of the organization rather than holding individual physicians 
liable.274 In doing so, enterprise liability would recognize patient care 
as the product of organizational forces. 
Although proposals for enterprise medical liability are not new, 
recognition of the close link between organizational culture and 
patient-care decisions provides a new justification for such 
 
itself as the provider of care and the plaintiff-patient relies on such 
representation or reasonably believes the physician to be an employee or 
agency of the organization. See id. at 977. Finally, hospitals and other 
organizations may be liable when their own negligence contributes to a 
physician’s substandard care. For example, hospitals have been held to 
have a duty to grant staff privileges only to competent physicians. See, 
e.g., Johnson v. Misercordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156 (Wis. 1981). 
Courts have also found a duty to supervise the care provided by 
physicians and other health care professionals employed or affiliated 
with the hospital. See, e.g., Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 
211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 946 (1966). 
272. For example, when the physician separately bills the patient, and the 
patient selects the physician caring for her rather than looking to the 
hospital to do so, courts do not consider the physician an agent of the 
hospital. See, e.g., Adamski, 579 P.2d at 975 (“[W]here the patient 
contacts his personal physician and is by him admitted to a hospital for 
treatment, and the doctor looks directly to the patient for his fees, the 
courts uniformly treat the physician as an independent contractor.”). In 
some jurisdictions hospitals and other organizations can defeat a claim 
under the theory of apparent agency if the organization informs the 
patient that the physician is an independent contractor. See, e.g., 
Baptist Mem’l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945, 950 (Tex. 1998) 
(ordering summary judgment for the defendant-hospital on plaintiff’s 
apparent agency claim when the hospital had posted signs in the 
emergency room notifying patients that its emergency room physicians 
were independent contractors and the plaintiff had signed a patient-
consent form stating the same). 
273. See Howard C. Klemme, The Enterprise Liability Theory of Torts, 47 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 153, 158 (1976) (defining enterprise liability as imposing 
onto an enterprise the losses to society caused by that enterprise). 
274. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability 
and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 Harv. L. 
Rev. 381, 383 (1994) (stating that under enterprise liability the 
organization would bear all liability for medical malpractice). 
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proposals.275 Specifically, enterprise liability would recognize that 
organizational norms and values may contribute to errors in 
physicians’ professional judgments, such as incorrect diagnoses or 
selecting deficient plans of treatment. By imposing sole legal 
responsibility for medical errors on HCOs, enterprise liability would 
motivate HCOs to pay closer attention to how their organizational 
culture may contribute to poor medical decision making by their 
affiliated physicians.  
2. Monitoring Organizational Patterns of Care 
As described in Part I, various payment reforms tie an HCO’s 
reimbursements to its performance on selected quality measures. For 
example, ACOs participating in the Medicare Shared Savings 
 
275. Proponents of enterprise medical liability previously have argued that 
enterprise liability offers numerous advantages over the traditional 
malpractice system, including a more efficient system of malpractice 
insurance and compensation. For example, Abraham and Weiler have 
argued that enterprise medical liability would result in a superior 
insurance system, as an organization’s claims experience is more 
predictable and stable than an individual physician’s claims experience. 
Id. at 403. Others have similarly argued that enterprises are “a superior 
fund for compensation and a superior risk-spreading instrument.” Barry 
R. Furrow, Enterprise Liability and Health Care Reform: Managing 
Care and Managing Risk, 39 St. Louis U. L.J. 79, 110 (1994). 
Proponents also argue that enterprise liability would reduce litigation 
costs by eliminating multiple defendants. See Abraham & Weiler, supra 
note 274, at 406; Furrow, supra at 112. Proponents of enterprise liability 
further claim that enterprise liability would promote better physician 
adherence to clinical guidelines and encourage greater cooperation 
between physicians and institutional providers such as hospitals. See E. 
Haavi Morreim, Playing Doctor: Corporate Medical Practice and 
Medical Malpractice, 32 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 939, 974 (1999) 
(stating that because enterprise liability relieves physicians of individual 
liability for malpractice, they may more readily participate in 
cooperative decision making and be less resistant to clinical practice 
guidelines). Finally, proponents argue that enterprise liability would 
improve the quality of patient care by enhancing HCOs’ incentives to 
reduce medical errors or mishaps, such as by implementing system-wide 
processes that would prevent avoidable infections or complications from 
adverse drug interactions. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 274, at 
408–12 (arguing that individual-based malpractice insurance dilutes the 
direct financial incentives to enhance the quality of care due to the 
absence of experience rating, whereas under enterprise liability 
premiums can be based on the enterprise’s claims experience, and that 
enterprise liability gives institutions an incentive to take a systems-
approach to preventing or catching errors); Gail B. Agrawal & Mark A. 
Hall, What If You Could Sue Your HMO? Managed Care Liability 
Beyond the ERISA Shield, 47 St. Louis U. L.J. 235 (2003) (stating 
that by imposing vicarious liability on health care systems, enterprise 
liability provides an incentive to take steps to minimize the opportunity 
for medical errors).  
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Program receive an overall performance score based on their 
performance on various quality measures, with those ACOs receiving 
a higher performance score awarded a higher shared savings bonus.276 
Policymakers contend that holding HCOs financially accountable for 
their performance on various quality measures will protect patients 
from poor-quality care.277 However, as I have discussed elsewhere, 
quality measures provide incomplete protection against poor-quality 
care given their inherent limitations, particularly for those domains of 
patient care characterized by uncertainty.278  
To guard against inappropriate or poor-quality care, regulators 
also should monitor HCOs’ patterns of care. Comparing HCOs’ 
utilization rates across a range of medical interventions would allow 
regulators to identify those HCOs with organizational cultures that 
lead to inappropriate patient-care decisions. While we would expect to 
see some variation in patterns of care across HCOs, significant 
deviations from the norm may be indicative of an organizational 
 
276. See 42 C.F.R. § 425.502(e) (2013) (outlining the process for calculating 
quality performance scores for participating ACOs); id. § 425.604(d) 
(providing that an ACO’s shared savings payment will vary based on its 
quality performance score); id. § 425.606(d) (same); see also Medicare 
Shared Savings Program: Accountable Care Organizations, 76 Fed. 
Reg. 69,802, 67,899–90 (codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 425) (outlining the 
points to be allocated under the performance scoring system and noting 
that the resulting score will be used to calculate an ACO’s shared 
savings payment).  
 An ACO is ineligible for the shared savings bonus if it fails to meet the 
minimum attainment level, that is, the thirtieth percentile, on at least 
one measure in each of the four domains. 42 C.F.R. 
§ 425.502(d)(2)(iii)(B) (2013). See generally id. § 425.502(b)(3) (setting 
the minimum attainment level); id. § 425.502(d)(1) (establishing four 
domains for quality measures: “Patient/care giver experience,” “Care 
coordination/Patient safety,” “Preventative health,” and “At-risk 
population”). Furthermore, an ACO that fails to score at or above the 
minimum attainment level on seventy percent of the performance 
measures in each domain may be subject to actions by CMS, including a 
warning, corrective action plan, or termination from the program. 
Id. §§ 425.216, 425.502(d)(2)(ii). 
277. See Eric C. Schneider et al., Payment Reform: Analysis of 
Models and Performance Measurement Implications 32, 38 
(2011) (stating that a key role of performance measures in a global or 
shared savings payment model is to ensure that quality does not decline 
and that HCOs, such as ACOs, do not reduce care inappropriately as 
they seek to reduce the cost of treating patients); Gregory J. Pelnar & 
Gretchen M. Weiss, Rule of Reason Analysis for Accountable Care 
Organizations, 11 Antitrust Source 1, 6 (2011) (stating that one 
purpose of quality measures is to prevent HCOs such as ACOs from 
undertreating patients).  
278. See Mantel, supra note 2, at 1428–35 (concluding that quality measures 
provided incomplete protection against poor-quality care). 
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culture that promotes unnecessary care or the withholding of 
appropriate care. Oversight agencies can then take appropriate 
enforcement action against HCOs with questionable patterns of care, 
such as bringing an action for fraudulent claims under the False 
Claims Act.279  
Conclusion 
While health care reform takes important steps toward the goal of 
universal access to medical care, many challenges remain. In 
particular, the United States must address rising health care costs and 
deficiencies in the quality of care. In addition, as we move toward 
payment models that will require providers to ration health care, we 
face the challenge of how best to ensure that they do so fairly. 
Addressing these fundamental issues requires that we understand how 
physicians make clinical decisions, with particular attention given to 
how HCOs’ organizational cultures influence the cognitive frameworks 
that guide physicians’ decision making. This Article fills this gap in 
our understanding by providing a theory of how an HCO’s 
organizational culture affects its physicians’ clinical judgments.  
Too frequently commentators narrowly focus on the individual 
physician, failing to appreciate the profound impact an organization’s 
culture has on the quality, cost, and modality of patient care. Of 
special concern are health organizations with cultures that bias 
physicians’ clinical decision making in ways that result in poor-quality 
or inefficient care. Commentators should revisit areas of health law, 
policy, and ethics that address patient care, inquiring as to whether 
they give due consideration to the role of the organization. Particular 
attention should be given to identifying legal and regulatory reforms 
that will advance more virtuous organizational cultures. Part IV of 
this Article begins the discussion of this important issue. 
Such reform efforts would benefit from additional conceptual and 
empirical work on the link between HCOs’ organizational cultures and 
physicians’ decision making. In particular, there is a need to better 
understand how physician behavior and patient outcomes differ in the 
context of varying organizational environments. For example, research 
identifying the cultural attributes of HCOs that most contribute to 
high-quality, efficient care would assist policymakers in their 
 
279. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(a) (2006) (requiring the Attorney General to 
“diligently . . . investigate a violation under section 3729” and allowing a 
civil action by the Attorney General if a violation is found). In recent years 
the United States Department of Justice and the Office of the Inspector 
General for the United States Department of Health and Human Services 
have prosecuted health care providers for poor-quality care under the False 
Claims Act. See Tracey E. Miller & Valerie L. Gutmann, Changing 
Expectations for Board Oversight of Healthcare Quality: The Emerging 
Paradigm, 2 J. Health & Life Sci. L. 31, 55 (2009). 
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regulation of HCOs. Admittedly, reforming health law, policy, and 
ethics on the basis of the limited research on these questions is 
fraught with risk. Nevertheless, the growing trend of physicians 
entering into closer affiliations with HCOs demands that we begin 
doing so. 
